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Abstract
Reservation price equilibria (RPE) do not accurately assess market power in consumer search markets. In 
most search markets, consumers do not know important elements of the environment in which they search 
(such as, for example, firms’ cost). We argue that when consumers learn when searching, RPE suffer from 
theoretical issues, such as non-existence and critical dependence on specific out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We 
characterize equilibria where consumers rationally choose search strategies that are not characterized by a 
reservation price. Non-RPE always exist and do not depend on specific out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Non-RPE 
have active consumer search and are consistent with recent empirical findings.
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1. Introduction
In consumer search markets, firms have market power due to the fact that some consumers do 
not make price comparisons. Firms take this market power into account when deciding on price. 
This paper addresses the question of whether, by focusing on consumers following reservation 
price strategies, the existing consumer search literature accurately evaluates this market power 
due to search frictions. A reservation price strategy is a cut-off strategy: after observing a price 
at or below some critical value, consumers decide to buy, otherwise they continue to search.
In markets where there is uncertainty about the underlying factors determining firms’ pricing 
behavior, there are important theoretical reasons to consider other search strategies than reser-
vation price strategies. Rothschild (1974) drew attention to the fact that when consumers do 
not know from which distribution of offers they obtain their information, the optimal consumer 
search rule may well be different from the typical reservation price rule.1 The main reason is 
that on the basis of past search observations, consumers learn about the environment in which 
they search. Depending on the environment, it may well be that, after observing a relatively good 
outcome, consumers infer that even better outcomes are likely to be observed in the next search 
round and rationally conclude to continue to search, whereas, after observing a relatively bad 
outcome, consumers infer that better outcomes are unlikely and thus stop searching.
The consumer search literature has, by and large, neglected this observation. The celebrated 
models by Stahl (1989) and Wolinsky (1986), and much of the literature that takes these models 
as a starting point, study environments without underlying uncertainty and in such theoretical en-
vironments the optimal search rule is indeed a reservation price rule. In consumer search markets 
where consumers are uninformed about firms’ underlying costs (and this probably comprises 
most markets where consumer search is important), learning is an important part of the search 
process. There are some papers on learning and consumer search that take consumer uncertainty 
about firms’ costs into consideration (see, Benabou and Gertner, 1993; Dana, 1994; Fishman, 
1996 and more recently, Yang and Ye, 2008; Tappata, 2009; Janssen et al., 2011 and Chandra 
and Tappata, 2011). The observations by Rothschild (1974) are of immediate concern to these 
environments, but the relevant economics literature has continued to focus on equilibria where 
the consumer search rule is characterized by a reservation price.
Some of this literature is inspired by retail gasoline markets where the common wholesale 
price of crude oil is the most important determinant of the (variation in) costs of retailers, and 
consumers are uncertain about these costs due to the large fluctuations of this wholesale price on 
the world market. Although our focus in this paper is on consumer search in retail markets, the is-
sues we address are also relevant for other markets. For example, Benabou and Gertner (1993) is 
motivated by macroeconomic concerns about inflationary uncertainty and the consequences for 
firms’ mark-ups, while a recent paper by Duffie et al. (2017) considers over-the-counter (OTC) 
financial markets and the role of benchmarks in these markets. The current paper is also relevant 
for the labor search literature where workers search for a better wage. In labor markets, it is nat-
ural that the wage distribution depends on the business cycle and that firms are better informed 
about the business cycle than workers. In that case, workers learn about the wage distribution 
while searching for another job and their search behavior does not need to follow a reservation 
1 Dubra (2004) studies how optimism and over confidence affect search.
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wage strategy. In all these markets, there is uncertainty and asymmetric information about a com-
mon component that determines the distribution of offers and one needs to understand how the 
uninformed side (consumers, workers) search and simultaneously learn in such an environment.
Our paper is the first to systematically incorporate Rothschild’s observations on non-
reservation price strategies into an equilibrium search model with endogenous firm behavior.2,3
Benabou and Gertner (1993) also mention the fact that in their model reservation price equilibria 
(RPE) may not exist. They set up the equations that have to be satisfied in a non-RPE. They per-
form some numerical analysis for some parameter values, but they neither have an analysis char-
acterizing these non-RPE, nor do they show the conditions under which these equilibria exist.4
The literature studying RPE in environments where consumers are uninformed about firms’ 
cost is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, RPE are known to exist only if the search 
cost is relatively large and/or the uncertainty about costs is relatively small (cf., Dana, 1994 and 
Janssen et al., 2011). It is unclear what type of equilibria do exist for small search cost or large 
uncertainty about common costs. Second, RPE implicitly assume certain out-of-equilibrium be-
liefs and it is unknown whether these out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy game theoretic refinement 
concepts commonly employed in asymmetric information games. Third, one would expect that 
when costs are uncertain consumers may engage in active costly search in equilibrium. When 
consumers observe a high price, they are uncertain about whether this is due to a relatively high 
(common) production costs or whether this particular firm is charging a high margin. RPE in 
these homogeneous goods markets have firms charging prices below the consumer reservation 
price, however, and therefore all consumers buy at the first firm they visit. This lack of consumer 
search gives firms substantial market power, but it may well be that RPE overestimate the true 
market power because they underestimate consumers’ search intensity.
In response to these points, this paper first sharpens existing results on RPE. We show (i) that 
independent of out-of-equilibrium beliefs, RPE do not exist when the uncertainty about produc-
tion cost is relatively large and (ii) that an RPE, even if it exists, is sensitive to the specification of 
out-of-equilibrium beliefs and do not satisfy, for example, the logic of the D1 equilibrium refine-
ment (hereafter the D1 logic, see Cho and Sobel, 1990). If the uncertainty about cost is relatively 
large, any equilibrium should have active search. We then continue to characterize non-RPE and 
show that they exist for all parameter values and that there are parameter values for which mul-
tiple non-RPE exist. Thus, non-RPE resolve the non-existence problem that RPE suffer from. 
Moreover, in any non-RPE, consumers actively search beyond the first firm. In particular, there 
is a region of “high” prices that are set with positive probability such that consumers are in-
different between buying and searching and consumers continue to search with strictly positive 
2 Even though our paper focuses on consumer search, similar considerations apply to the labor search literature that 
uses reservation wage equilibrium as a solution concept (see McCall, 1970 for pioneering work in this direction, and 
subsequent literature as, for example, surveyed in Rogerson et al., 2005).
3 Lauermann et al. (2017) consider a bargaining and matching environment with uncertainty about the relative scarcity 
of a commodity. They also do not restrict themselves to studying reservation price strategies, but their set-up is different 
as they have one side of the market competing in an auction to acquire the good from the other side of the market, instead 
of markets where firms post prices (as in our setting).
4 Benabou and Gertner (1993, p. 74) state that the “non-reservation price equilibria (if they exist) are too complicated 
for us to solve” and argue that these equilibria are “somewhat less appealing intuitively than the previous reservation 
price equilibria” (p. 81) as they think the reservation price property is “required in particular for demand functions to be 
downward sloping” (p. 74). This is, however, only partially the case. In order to make firms indifferent over the range of 
prices in a mixed strategy equilibrium, a firm’s expected total demand must be downward sloping. In the non-RPE in our 
model, the demand of an individual consumer must have a downward sloping part and may have an upward sloping part.
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probability. When the cost uncertainty is large, market prices may be substantially below the 
market prices predicted by RPE due to active search by consumers. On the other hand, when cost 
uncertainty is small, expected market prices are larger in non-RPE. Thus, whether or not RPE 
overestimate the market power of firms depends on the uncertainty about cost.
In a recent empirical paper, De los Santos et al. (2012) show that, when buying books online 
consumers do not follow reservation price strategies. These strategies predict that (i) consumers 
buy from the last store visited unless all stores have been visited and (ii) the decision whether 
to continue to search depends on the outcome of the previous search with consumers observ-
ing lower prices deciding to buy, and consumers observing larger prices deciding to continue 
searching. Their evidence contradicts these predictions.5 In this paper, we show that their em-
pirical findings are consistent with equilibrium behavior under non-reservation price strategies, 
as follows. When the cost uncertainty is relatively large, non-RPE have a region of intermediate 
prices where the probability of a sale is lower when the price is low. At lower prices, consumers 
rationally expect to get lower prices on the next search round and this may induce them to search 
more. In particular, we show that consumers may accept higher prices in the first search round, 
while rejecting lower prices. In an extension to oligopolistic markets, we also show that the 
optimal sequential search behavior of consumers is consistent with consumers going back to 
previously sampled firms, before they have sampled all firms.6
There is also a relationship with the marketing oriented literature on reference price effects 
(see, e.g., Putler, 1992; Kalyanaram and Winer, 1995 and Mazumdar et al., 2005). This literature 
points to the fact that consumers have particular pricing points around which consumer demand 
is very sensitive to price changes. This may lead to situations where consumer demand drops 
significantly if firms price above this reference point, whereas at higher prices, consumers are 
willing to buy again. Such “reference point” demand behavior can occur in non-RPE when the 
cost uncertainty is large. After observing intermediate prices above the “reference price”, con-
sumers rationally infer that these prices are not chosen by high cost firms. Knowing costs are 
low, consumers find these prices too high to buy, however, and they continue to search for sure. 
This inference creates a gap in the equilibrium price distribution of the low cost firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the equilib-
rium concept. Section 3 discusses how RPE depend on assumptions regarding out-of-equilibrium 
beliefs and why (regardless of these out-of-equilibrium beliefs) they do not exist when cost uncer-
tainty is relatively large. Section 4 describes our analytical results on non-RPE. Section 5 shows, 
by means of a numerical analysis, the effects of cost uncertainty on profits, expected prices and 
consumer welfare. Section 6 briefly discusses a generalization of our model to the case of imper-
fectly correlated production costs and oligopoly markets with N firms. We show that with three 
or more firms, the optimal search rule may imply that consumers first continue searching an-
other firm, and then go back to a previously sampled firm before all firms are sampled. Section 7
concludes with a discussion, while proofs are given in two Appendices.
2. The model and equilibrium concept
The sequential search model we analyze is based on the homogeneous goods models studied 
in Dana (1994) and Janssen et al. (2011).7 The basic model we analyze in the next three Sections 
5 A similar conclusion is drawn in a recent paper on insurance markets (see, Honka and Chintagunta, 2017).
6 This last observation can also be rationalized by assuming that consumers face an increasing search cost.
7 Search models for heterogeneous goods typically follow the model developed by Wolinsky (1986). In that model, 
firms choose pure price strategies as uncertainty resulting from the match distribution of product variety is exogenously 
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incorporates cost uncertainty in a duopoly version of Stahl (1989).8 Firms produce a homoge-
neous good and compete in prices. The production cost of each firm equals c, which can take one 
of two values, c ∈ {cL, cH }, cL ≤ cH . Production cost is common for both firms. Denote by α the 
probability that c = cH , where 0 < α < 1. Firms observe their production cost, but consumers do 
not. After observing the realization of cost, firms simultaneously set prices. We denote the (sym-
metric), perhaps degenerate, price distributions chosen by firms by FL(p) and FH(p) when cost 
is low or high, respectively. The highest price which will be charged by low and high cost firms 
is denoted by pL and pH , respectively, whereas the respective lowest prices will be denoted by 
p
L
and p
H
. Each firm’s objective is to maximize profits, taking the prices charged by the other 
firm and consumers’ search behavior as given.
The demand side of the market is represented by a unit mass of risk-neutral consumers with 
identical preferences and unit demand. A fraction λ ∈ (0, 1) of consumers, shoppers, have a 
zero search cost. These consumers sample all prices and buy at the lowest price. The remaining 
fraction of 1 − λ consumers – non-shoppers – search sequentially and have a positive search 
cost s > 0 to obtain one additional price quote. They visit each of the two firms at their first 
search with equal probability. These consumers face a non-trivial problem when searching for 
low prices, as they have to trade off the search cost with the expected benefit from search. Af-
ter observing their first price quote, non-shoppers update their beliefs about firms’ underlying 
production costs using Bayes’ rule. Consumers can always go back to previously visited firms, 
incurring no additional cost.9 We denote the probability that non-shoppers buy after observing 
price p by β(p). With the remaining probability 1 − β(p) these consumers continue to search. 
As consumers do not know the underlying production cost, β(p) does not depend on the cost 
realization. Denote by ρi the consumers’ reservation price if they were to infer that the firms’ 
production cost equals ci for sure, i = L, H .
The timing of the model is as follows. First, Nature chooses c for both firms. After observing c, 
firms simultaneously decide on their prices. Finally, consumers search and make their purchase 
decisions.
We consider Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game. A (symmetric) equilibrium is a tuple 
of (i) pricing strategies Fi(p), i = L, H such that any p in the support of Fi maximizes firm 
i’s profit, (ii) an optimal search strategy β(p) minimizing the expected price (including search 
cost) at which a consumer buys given her beliefs, and (iii) beliefs that are consistent with firms’ 
pricing strategies on the equilibrium path.
It is by now a standard argument in the search literature with symmetric information that due 
to the presence of shoppers and non-shoppers there do not exist equilibria with mass points in the 
price distributions. This argument continues to hold in our model with asymmetric information 
as far as pure pricing strategies are concerned: even if all non-shoppers continue to search, an 
undercutting firm will sell to all shoppers and non-shoppers that first visit that firm. In the present 
model, this argument does not extend, however, to ruling out pricing distribution with mass 
imposed. Janssen and Shelegia (2015b) introduce common cost uncertainty in that model and show that firms continue 
to choose pure strategies and consumers learning the state of the world upon observing a price follow reservation price 
strategies. Thus, the issues we point at in this paper with the non-existence of RPE are not relevant in that alternative 
search context.
8 It is not difficult to extend the analysis to oligopoly situations if we replace sequential search with newspaper search, 
in which upon paying a search cost (after observing the first search) consumers are immediately informed about all 
(N − 1) other prices. Extending the analysis with sequential search to oligopoly markets is not straightforward and we 
discuss the extent to which we can generalize the results in Section 6.2.
9 Janssen and Parakhonyak (2014) analyze the case where this assumption is replaced by costly recall.
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points. Given that equilibria have to be in mixed strategies and that we prove that equilibria 
without mass points always exist, we restrict our attention to mixed pricing strategies without 
atoms.
As explained in the Introduction, the existing literature focuses on reservation price equilibria, 
which are defined as follows.
Definition 1. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a Reservation Price Equilibrium if there exists a 
p0 such that β(p) = 1 for all p ≤ p0 and β(p) = 0 for all p > p0.
When investigating non-RPE, we focus on equilibria satisfying the logic of the D1 criterion 
(Cho and Sobel, 1990).10 The D1 criterion was developed in the context of pure signaling games 
with one sender. Our model is a two-sender game, where the beliefs of the receivers (the non-
shoppers) are only based on the single price they have observed. As firms are of the same type, 
the out-of-equilibrium belief of non-shoppers is simply a mapping from the observed price to the 
type distribution of cost, as in the one-sender game.
Consider any perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the equilibrium profit of firm j when it 
is of type i is given by πj∗i , i = H, L. Consider any p outside the support of the equilibrium 
price distribution. This out-of-equilibrium price generates a set of possible optimal actions of 
the receiver (non-shopper). Let Bj(p) be the set of a firm j ’s total demand from shoppers and 
non-shoppers that can be generated by buying probabilities βj(p) of non-shoppers (at firm j at 
price p) that are best responses to some non-shoppers’ belief. A qj (p) ∈ Bj (p) ⊂ [0, 1] is an 
element of this set. For out-of-equilibrium price that are larger than the highest price charged 
along the equilibrium path, shoppers will not buy and demand at such a price is bounded by 1−λ2 . 
The D1 refinement compares the sets of demands {qj ∈ Bj (p) : (p − ci)qj ≥ πj∗i } for which it 
is gainful for different types i of firm j to deviate to price p. If for i, i′ ∈ {H, L}, i′ = i,
{qj ∈ Bj (p) : (p − ci)qj ≥ πj∗i } ⊂ {qj ∈ Bj (p) : (p − ci′)qj > πj∗i′ }
where “⊂” stands for strict inclusion, the D1 logic requires that the out-of-equilibrium beliefs 
of non-shoppers (upon observing a unilateral deviation by firm j to price p) should assign zero 
probability to the event that firm j is of type i and thus (as there are only two types and firms 
have a common type), assign probability one to firm j being of type i′.11 Intuitively, as type i′
has an incentive to deviate to p for a larger set of responses by the non-shoppers than type i, the 
first type is said to have a stronger incentive to deviate.
In addition, we will focus on equilibria where β(p) is continuously differentiable almost 
everywhere as follows. Let P = [0, p], with p = max{pL, pH } and define sets P(0,1) = {p : p ∈
P, 0 < β(p) < 1}, P1 = {p : p ∈ P, β(p) = 1} and P0 = {p : p ∈ P, β(p) = 0}.12 We consider 
10 Ideally, we want to make sure that the upper bound of the price distribution does not depend on arbitrary out-of-
equilibrium beliefs. In the next section we show that this can be achieved when consumers, after observing the highest 
price charged in equilibrium, believe that they are in a high cost environment. This implies that independent of their 
beliefs at higher prices consumers prefer to search for a better price after observing such higher price. As we show later 
the D1 criterion implies that after observing a price equal to the upper bound of the price distribution consumers believe 
that they are in a high cost environment. Accordingly, if a pricing strategy profile is part of an equilibrium for beliefs that 
satisfy the D1 criterion, it is also part of an equilibrium for any other out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
11 A similar treatment is given in Janssen and Roy (2010) for a more complicated inference problem where consumers 
observe all prices and there are N firms.
12 Note that it is not the case that all sets Pi that satisfy the criteria are necessarily convex. In Section 4 we provide 
examples of equilibria where the set of all prices with β = 1 or with β ∈ (0, 1) are non-convex.
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equilibria, where β(p) is continuously differentiable in the interior of these sets, and refer to this 
as β(p) ∈ C1.13
Definition 2. A symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a non-reservation price equilibria 
(non-RPE) that satisfies the D1 logic and is sufficiently smooth if (i) it does not satisfy Defini-
tion 1, (ii) β(p) ∈ C1, (iii) Fi(·) are continuous and (iv) consumers’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs 
are consistent with the D1 logic.
Thus, from the set of equilibria that do not satisfy Definition 1, we focus on those equilibria 
that satisfy the D1 logic and that are sufficiently smooth. For easy reference, we refer to such 
equilibria in the rest of the paper as non-reservation price equilibria (non-RPE). There may exist 
other equilibria that do not satisfy the properties of a RPE and that do not satisfy the D1 re-
quirement and are not smooth. We do not consider these equilibria in our paper as we show that 
even with the additional requirements of D1 and smoothness, we can guarantee existence. More-
over, the equilibria we consider are interesting in their own right and do not depend on arbitrary 
out-of-equilibrium beliefs or on more technical issues related to non-smoothness.
3. Reservation price equilibria
In this Section, we summarize some existing results on RPE, (i) prove that they do not exist 
if the cost uncertainty is large and (ii) prove that they do not satisfy the D1 logic even if they do 
exist.
Dana (1994) has characterized RPE in our model, while Janssen et al. (2011) have generalized 
that analysis to N firms and production cost being distributed according to a continuous distri-
bution function. For N = 2, Janssen et al. (2011) showed that the equilibrium price distribution 
for cost realization ci is given by
F(p|ci) = 1 − 1 − λ2λ
p¯ − p
p − ci , i = L,H (1)
with support on [p
i
, p¯] with p
i
= 2λ1+λci + 1−λ1+λ p¯, i = L, H , and p¯ = ρ, the consumers’ reser-
vation price. The derivation of the mixed strategy distribution follows from the fact that given a 
firm’s own price p, its profit is given by[
λ(1 − Fi(p))+ 1 − λ2
]
(p − ci), i = L,H,
and that in a mixed strategy equilibrium, this profit has to be equal to the profit the firm gets if it 
sets a price equal to the upper bound ρ of the price distribution, 1−λ2 (ρ − ci). It follows that the 
respective density functions are given by14
fi(p) = 1 − λ2λ
ρ − ci
(p − ci)2 , i = L,H, (2)
and that the reservation price ρ is implicitly determined by
13 Smoothness of the β(p) function is needed to assure that the process of Bayesian updating of the underlying cost is 
continuous on the relevant sets.
14 As p ≥ p
i
> ci it follows that the densities are finite.
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ρ = s + αfH (ρ)
αfH (ρ)+ (1 − α)fL(ρ)E(p|cH )+
(1 − α)fL(ρ)
αfH (ρ)+ (1 − α)fL(ρ)E(p|cL). (3)
The latter equation basically says that at the reservation price, the consumer must be indifferent 
between buying now (and paying a price ρ) and continuing to search, which costs s, and paying 
the expected price, giving the consumer updates her beliefs about whether the underlying cost 
is high or low. Janssen et al. (2011) show that the expression for the reservation price can be 
rewritten as ρ = E(c|ρ) + s1−γ , where γ is a parameter that only depends on λ and N (which 
equals two in our case).
A few results that will be used later follow from this characterization. First, no firm charges 
prices above the reservation price. Second, the low and high cost densities at the reservation price 
are positive, i.e., fi(ρ) > 0. This implies that the posterior belief that cost is low after observing 
the reservation price, Pr(cL|ρ), which is given by
Pr(cL|ρ) = (1 − α)fL(ρ)
αfH (ρ)+ (1 − α)fL(ρ) ,
is strictly larger than 0 (and strictly smaller than 1). Third, for any price p that is in the support of 
the equilibrium price distributions in both states of the world, the density in the low cost state is 
smaller than the density in the high cost state. This implies that FH(p) first-order stochastically 
dominates FL(p). Thus, the expected price when cost is low is smaller than the expected cost 
when cost is high, i.e.,
E(p|cL) < E(p|cH ). (4)
Formally, Dana (1994) and Janssen et al. (2011) only show that a sufficient condition for the 
existence of an RPE is that the cost uncertainty cH − cL is sufficiently small and that the search 
cost s is sufficiently large. To show that these are also necessary conditions, we first show that if 
cH − cL is sufficiently large or s is sufficiently small an RPE does not exist irrespective of the 
out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
Proposition 1. If cH − cL is sufficiently large, or s is sufficiently small an RPE does not exist.
We illustrate the “cH − cL being sufficiently large” part of Proposition 1 in Fig. 1, where we 
depict the solutions to equations (1)–(3) for various cost differences. If an RPE exists, it should 
be the solution to equations (1)–(3). As the Figure shows, consumers’ beliefs discretely change at 
p
H
, as for all p < p
H
consumers infer that they are in a low cost environment. When cL = 30, as 
on the left pane of the Figure, this does not cause a problem with the equilibrium construction, as 
the net benefit of search is still negative. However, if cL = 8, the reservation price ρL conditional 
on being in the low cost environment is smaller than p
H
, and for prices just below p
H
the net 
benefit of search is positive. Therefore, an RPE does not exist as non-shoppers prefer to continue 
to search for lower prices after observing a price just below p
H
.
15
The result of Proposition 1 also holds for heterogeneous search costs. In order to see this, 
fix some (sufficiently large) cH and (sufficiently small) s. Then, as it follows from the proof 
15 Note that the non-existence of an RPE for large cost uncertainty (and the “gap in the set of accepted prices”) does not 
depend on the assumption of a binary cost state. If we think of cH and cL as the upper and lower bounds of the set of 
possible cost states with a distribution that is concentrated around these upper and lower bounds, then it continues to be 
true that the incentive to continue searching may change dramatically (although not discontinuously) when a price just 
below or just above p
H
is observed. In fact, Janssen et al. (2011) contains an example where an RPE fails to exist if cost 
is uniformly distributed.
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Fig. 1. RPE and incentives to search.
of Proposition 1 there is a sufficiently small cL such that the reservation price, conditional on 
knowing that the cost is low, is below cH . As a high-cost firm will not price below cH , this 
implies that consumers would search for prices just below cH . Now, if search costs are distributed 
on some interval [s′, s] below the search costs considered in Proposition 1, the distribution of 
prices for low-cost firms cannot be higher than the one for a single search cost s, and therefore 
consumers would still search actively for prices just below cH .
We next show that if an RPE does not exist, any equilibrium without mass points should have 
a region of prices where non-shoppers actively search (search with positive probability).
Proposition 2. For any search cost s > 0, if cH − cL is sufficiently large, then consumers search 
with positive probability in any PBE with continuous Fi(·).
Basically, from the first part of the proof of Proposition 1 we can use the fact that ρL < pH for 
cH − cL being sufficiently large. This implies there should be a region of prices just above pH
where there is active search to keep the low cost firm indifferent between charging these prices 
and ρL. The cut-off value of cH − cL where an RPE does not exist anymore in Proposition 1 is 
be exactly the cut-off value where consumers search with positive probability in Proposition 2.
Finally, we show that any RPE, even if it exists for some out-of-equilibrium beliefs, does not
satisfy the D1 logic. The D1 logic asks which type of firm (high or low cost) has most incentive 
to deviate to prices above the reservation price. It turns out that high cost firms have stronger 
incentives to deviate; see the proof of the next Proposition for details. This implies that if a 
consumer continues to search after observing an out-of-equilibrium price ρ + ε, for small ε, she 
expects to pay E(p|cH ) + s, including the search cost. If the consumer buys immediately, she 
pays ρ + ε, which using (7) can be rewritten as
ε + Pr(cH |ρ)E(p|cH )+ Pr(cL|ρ)E(p|cL)+ s.
This expression is strictly smaller than the expected payment in case of search if, and only if,
Pr(cL|ρ) (E(p|cH )−E(p|cL)) > ε.
From (2) and (4) it follows that the LHS is strictly positive. Thus, one can choose ε sufficiently 
small so that at ρ+ε it is optimal to buy. Firms would then, however, have an incentive to deviate 
and set these higher prices defying the notion of equilibrium. The next Proposition formalizes 
this logic and extends it to all equilibria without active search.
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Proposition 3. All perfect Bayesian equilibria in which non-shoppers buy with probability one 
in the first search round and in which Fi(p) is continuous, do not satisfy the D1 logic.
There are two important corollaries, which follow immediately from Proposition 3. First, as 
in any RPE firms’ pricing distributions are atomless (see, e.g. Stahl, 1989), and there is no active 
search (see Dana, 1994), we immediately have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. All reservation price equilibria do not satisfy the D1 logic.
Second, by Definition 2 we have
Corollary 2. In any non-reservation price equilibrium non-shoppers search with positive proba-
bility.
Note that the D1 logic may be extreme in the sense that it requires that Pr(cL|p) = 0 for any 
p > ρ. Following the logic of the proof, even weaker restrictions on the out-of-equilibrium be-
liefs are sufficient to eliminate RPE, however. RPE requires that after observing prices above the 
reservation price, consumers infer that cost is low with sufficiently high probability. Thus, RPE 
do not exist either if the out-of-equilibrium beliefs are discontinuous and such that there exists a 
k > 0 such that Pr(cL|p) + k < Pr(cL|ρ) for any p > ρ. RPE can, however, be compatible with 
out-of-equilibrium beliefs Pr(cL|p) that are strictly decreasing for p > ρ and that are continuous 
at ρ.
4. Characterization and existence of non-RPE
In any non-RPE, a firm’s profit π(p|ci) when setting price p and cost is ci , i = H, L can be 
written as
π(p|ci) =
⎡
⎢⎣λ(1 − Fi(p))+ 1 − λ2 β(p)+ 1 − λ2 (1 − β(p))(1 − Fi(p))+
1 − λ
2
p∫
p
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜
⎤
⎥⎦ (p − ci).
(5)
This expression can be understood as follows. First, a firm only attracts shoppers if the other firm 
charges a higher price, which occurs with probability 1 − Fi(p). The number of non-shoppers 
buying from firm i gives a more complicated expression. There is a fraction (1 − λ)/2 of non-
shoppers that randomly first visits firm i, and buys immediately from that firm with probability 
β(p). The remaining non-shoppers that randomly first visit firm i continue searching the other 
firm and come back to firm i if the other firm has a higher price. Finally, the non-shoppers that 
first visit the other firm and decide to continue to search buy from firm i if it has a lower price. 
As firm i does not know which price the other firm charges, this expression involves an expected 
number of consumers.
To characterize the price distributions of non-RPE, we first show that the upper bounds of the 
low and high cost price distributions have to be identical. If this were not the case, there would 
be a region of prices above the upper bound of, say, the low cost distribution that are only chosen 
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by high cost firms, and this would imply that β(p) = 1. Low cost firms would then have an 
incentive, however, to deviate to such prices.
Lemma 1. In PBE with continuous Fi(p), thus, in any non-RPE, pL = pH ≡ p.
Without mass points, a firm setting a price equal to the upper bound p of the price distribution 
will not sell to the shoppers and their profits will be equal to 1−λ2 β(p)(p−ci). As in equilibrium, 
for any price in the support of the price distribution this expression has to be equal to (5), we have 
that
λ(1 − Fi(p))+ 1 − λ2 β(p)+
1 − λ
2
(1 − β(p))(1 − Fi(p))+
1 − λ
2
p∫
p
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜ = 1 − λ2 β(p)
p − ci
p − ci .
(6)
At intervals of prices in the support of the price distribution where β(p) = 1, or, β(p) =
0, this equation can be solved for Fi(p) in a straightforward manner. As we concentrate on 
equilibria where β(p) is continuously differentiable in the interior of P(0,1), equation (6) can be 
transformed into an exact differential equation that can be solved as shown in the proof of the 
following Proposition.
Proposition 4. If F(p) is a price distribution in a non-RPE, then it should be of the following 
form:
Fi(p) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2
√
1−(1−λ)β(p)−∫ pp (1−λ)β(p)(p−ci )(
p˜−ci
)2√1−(1−λ)β(p˜) dp˜
2
√
1−(1−λ)β(p) if p ∈ P(0,1)
1 − 1−λ2λ
[
β(p)
p−ci
p−ci − 1 −
∫ p
p
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜
]
if p ∈ P1
1 − 1−λ1+λ
[
β(p)
p−ci
p−ci −
∫ p
p
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜
]
if p ∈ P0
(7)
Using the characterization of the price distributions, we can now state that FH(p) first-order 
stochastically dominates the low cost distribution FL(p). Thus, as in RPE, we continue to have 
the expected price when cost is low, E(p|cL), being lower than the expected price when cost is 
high, E(p|cH ).
Corollary 3. In any non-RPE, for all p < p, FL(p) ≥ FH (p) and whenever 0 < FH(p) < 1, 
FL(p) >FH(p).
Using these characterizations of the distribution functions, it is not too difficult to see that if we 
want that the upper bound of the distributions p is not determined by arbitrary out-of-equilibrium 
beliefs, it must be the case that after observing p consumers believe that firms have high cost 
for sure, and that given this inference, non-shoppers are indifferent between buying now and 
continuing to search. If this were not the case, and non-shoppers had out-of-equilibrium beliefs 
such that Pr(c = cH |p) = 1 for prices p > p, then they would prefer to buy at these prices, giving 
firms an incentive to deviate (see the proof of Proposition 3 for details). Thus, the density of the 
low cost distribution at the upper bound must be equal to zero,
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fL(p) = 0 (8)
and the upper bound of the price distributions has to be equal to the reservation price in the case 
where consumers know cost is high, i.e.,
p∫
p
H
FH (p)dp = s. (9)
As FH (p) first-order stochastically dominates FL(p) this implies that if an out-of-equilibrium 
price larger than p is observed, consumers will always want to continue to search independent 
of their beliefs of the underlying cost.
To fully characterize an equilibrium of the model, we have to inquire into the non-shoppers’ 
equilibrium strategy, β(p), with 0 ≤ β(p) ≤ 1. Optimal search behavior implies that whenever 
0 < β(p) < 1 the non-shopper is indifferent between buying now and continuing to search, im-
plying that
(1 − α)fL(p)
(1 − α)fL(p)+ αfH (p)	L(p)+
αfH (p)
(1 − α)fL(p)+ αfH (p)	H (p) = s, (10)
where 	i(p) =
∫ p
0 Fi(x)dx. This equation says that after a non-shopper observes price p she 
will update her beliefs about the underlying cost of the firms and given these updated beliefs 
concludes that buying now yields the same expected pay-off as continuing to search. Optimal 
search behavior also implies that the non-shoppers strictly prefer to buy (β(p) = 1) if the LHS of 
(10) is strictly smaller than s and that the non-shoppers strictly prefer to search (β(p) = 0) if the 
LHS of (10) is strictly larger than s. Together with (7) this behavior characterizes an equilibrium.
As shown in Appendix A, equation (10) defines a differential equation which, starting from 
initial conditions for p and β(p), defines the function β(p) going downward.16 This function can 
continue to satisfy 0 < β(p) < 1 or it may at some price point p reach the boundaries β(p) = 1
or β(p) = 0. If for some prices β(p) = 1, the following Lemma shows that (10) implies that in 
any equilibrium β ′(p) = 0 has to hold at the largest price point p where β(p) = 1.
Lemma 2. Let p∗ be such that β(p∗) = 1 and for any sufficiently small 
 > 0 β(p∗ + 
) < 1. 
Suppose that p∗ is in the interior of the support of Fi(p), i = L, H . Then in equilibrium it must 
be that β ′(p∗) = 0.
We will now inquire into the existence question. The main question is whether for all param-
eter values cL, cH , λ, α and s we can find values of p and β(p) such that equation (7) defines 
proper distribution functions that are upward sloping, and that the search strategy of non-shoppers 
satisfies the optimality condition (10).17 Our main Theorem shows that a non-reservation price 
equilibrium as defined in Definition 2 exists for all values of the exogenous parameters.
Theorem 1. For any values of s, λ, cL, cH and α a non-reservation price equilibrium as de-
fined in Definition 2 exists. The equilibrium price distributions are characterized by (7), while 
non-shopper’s behavior is determined by (10) whenever 0 < β(p) < 1.
16 Note that (10) implies that we should have β ′(p) = −β(p)/(p − cL) as derived in Proposition A.1 in Appendix A.
17 In Appendix B we show that for given FL(p) and FH (p) (10) essentially is a differential equation that determines 
the function β(p) up to the boundary condition β(p).
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Fig. 2. No-gap equilibrium.
The proof is constructive and consists of several Lemmas. It is formally developed in Ap-
pendix B. For a range of parameter values the equilibrium is not unique, while for other parameter 
values it is unique. We now extensively describe how for any set of parameter values we construct 
an equilibrium.
The four-step procedure works as follows. First, we show that we can always find values p¯
and β(p¯) such that the solution of the system of equations (7) and (10) satisfies two boundary 
conditions: β ′(p∗) = 0 and ∫ p¯
p
H
FH (p)dp = s, where p∗ is defined in Lemma 2. Given the values 
of p¯ and β(p¯), we take β(p) = 1 for all p < p∗ and define ρL such that
ρL∫
p
L
FL(p)dp = s. (11)
Here we can distinguish between two cases. If ρL ≥ pH then we claim we have found a non-
reservation price equilibrium without a gap in both price distributions. In this so-called no-gap 
equilibrium, as in any other non-RPE, conditions (8) and (9) must be satisfied, so after observing 
p non-shoppers are indifferent between buying now and continuing to search. At all prices p with 
p∗ < p < p¯ both fL(p) and fH (p) are strictly positive and (10) guarantees that non-shoppers 
are indifferent over the whole interval. Finally, Lemma A.3 in Appendix B shows that if we 
specify β(p) = 1 for all p < p∗, then the equilibrium density functions are such that consumers 
indeed prefer to buy at all these prices. Lemmas A.1 and A.2 prove that (7) always define proper 
price distributions. An example of a no-gap equilibrium is given in Fig. 2. This Figure illustrates 
that at high prices β(p) < 1 and at lower prices β(p) = 1 and the price distributions do not have 
a gap. Fig. 2 also illustrates that the demand of individual consumers is downward sloping.
The second possibility is that the condition ρL ≥ pH is violated. In that case, it is natural 
to have out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfying Pr(cL|p) = 1 for all p ∈ (ρL, pH ) implying that 
consumers would not like to buy at these prices and β(p) = 0. This out-of-equilibrium belief not 
only follows from the D1 logic, but also from the weaker notion of the Intuitive Criterion (Cho 
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and Kreps, 1987).18 For given values of the other parameters, ρL < pH will arise when the cost 
difference cH − cL is sufficiently large, i.e., the same reason why an RPE may fail to exist for 
any out-of-equilibrium belief (see Proposition 1 in Section 3).
Below, in steps (2)–(4) we indicate different ways an equilibrium with a gap can be con-
structed. A gap equilibrium configuration presumes that β(p) = 0 for all p ∈ (ρL, pH ) and 
FL(ρL) = FL(p′), where ρL < p′ ≤ pH . In steps (2)–(3) we claim that p′ = pH as β(pH ) > 0
requires that for any price p ∈ (ρL, pH ) the low cost density function is equal to 0. Moreover, for 
all p ∈ [p
L
, ρL) we must have β(p) = 1 due to the fact that at ρL non-shoppers are indifferent 
between buying and not buying even if they know that the underlying cost is low. Finally, it must 
be the case that β(p
H
) < 1 as otherwise the low quality firms cannot be indifferent between 
setting p
H
and ρL as the chance to attract shoppers is the same at both prices.
The second step in the equilibrium construction procedure is then to try to construct a non-
reservation price equilibrium (in case there is no “no-gap equilibrium”) that is close to the 
“no-gap equilibrium” in that there also exists an interval of prices p ∈ [x, p∗] with p
H
< x < p∗
where β(p) = 1. The main difference with the “no-gap equilibrium” is that β(p) < 1 for prices 
p with p
H
< p < x. In addition to the two parameter values and two boundary conditions we 
encountered above in the “no-gap equilibrium”, we have one more parameter value that we can 
choose, namely x to make sure that πL(ρL) = π(pH ), where ρL has to satisfy (11). In the 
proof of the main theorem in Appendix B, we show that if there is no “no-gap equilibrium” 
and ρL < pH we can satisfy this third boundary condition as well with a positive size of a gap, 
provided that we can find an x such that x ≤ p∗. For lack of a better term, we call such a non-
reservation price equilibrium, a monopolistic gap equilibrium for the fact that there is a interval 
of prices p ∈ [x, p∗] where β(p) = 1 and firms have some “monopoly power” over non-shoppers 
as they always buy.
Fig. 3 illustrates a monopolistic gap equilibrium. At prices close to p, but also at prices close 
to p
H
non-shoppers are indifferent between buying and continuing to search and β(p) < 1. At 
prices at and close to p
H
, β(p) > 0 and β ′(p) > 0 and the low cost distribution function is much 
steeper in this price region than the high cost distribution function. There is a relatively small gap 
in the low cost price distribution and β(p) = 1 for all p ≤ ρL. At the lowest price p such that 
β(p) = 1, β(p) is not continuously differentiable.19
The third step in the procedure starts from the fact that if a no-gap equilibrium does not exist, 
then a monopolistic gap equilibrium may also fail to exist if we cannot find a value x ≤ p∗
such that all necessary boundary conditions are satisfied. In this case, we try to construct an 
equilibrium with 0 < β(p) < 1 for all p ≥ p
H
. As there is no price p ≥ p
H
where β(p) = 1
the condition that β ′(p∗) = 0 is no longer relevant. So we need the two parameter values β(p¯)
and p¯ to satisfy the two boundary conditions (9) and (11) which are relevant for this type of 
equilibrium, and ρL is determined from the indifference condition πL(ρL) = πL(pH ). Here we 
18 Intuitively, the reason is as follows: by setting a price equal to p
H
a high cost firm already attracts all shoppers and 
all non-shoppers that first visited that firm. Of the remaining non-shoppers it will sell to all who continue to search after 
having visited the first firm. By deviating to a lower price, a firm can never get a higher demand, and lowering the price, 
can only lower the profits. A low cost firm may have an incentive to deviate to prices p ∈ (ρL, pH ) if β(p) is sufficiently 
high. As the high cost type does not have an incentive to deviate and the low cost type may have an incentive (depending 
on the reaction of the non-shoppers), the Intuitive Criterion implies that β(p) = 0 for all p ∈ (ρL, pH ).
19 Note that Lemma 2 only applies to the largest price p where β(p) = 1.
134 M.C.W. Janssen et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 172 (2017) 120–162
Fig. 3. Monopolistic gap equilibrium.
Fig. 4. Regular gap equilibrium.
can get multiple equilibria which can also coexist with a monopolistic gap equilibrium. We call 
this type of equilibrium where 0 <β(p) < 1 for all p ≥ p
H
a regular gap equilibrium.20
Fig. 4 illustrates a regular gap equilibrium. In this equilibrium, there are four regions of prices 
where non-shoppers exhibit different behavior. At high prices (above p), consumers definitely 
continue to search. Consumers are indifferent between buying and continuing to search for all 
prices p ∈ [p
H
, p] as they update their beliefs about cost being low and the probability of finding 
lower prices if continuing to search. At prices below p
H
(and above ρL) non-shoppers search for 
sure. Finally, at prices below ρL non-shoppers buy for sure.
The fourth and final step in the procedure starts from the fact that if neither a no-gap equilib-
rium nor a monopolistic gap equilibrium exists, the only reason why we cannot find parameter 
values β(p¯) and p¯ to satisfy the two boundary conditions of a regular gap equilibrium is if the 
20 Obviously, an equilibrium where β(p) = 1 at just one point p ≥ p
H
is a transition between the monopolistic gap and 
the regular gap equilibrium.
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Fig. 5. Competitive gap equilibrium.
constraint β(p) > 0 for all p ≥ p
H
cannot be satisfied. From Lemmas A.4–A.7 in Appendix B
it follows that if this constraint is violated for some prices p, it is certainly violated for all 
smaller prices. Thus, in our final step we construct an equilibrium where βH(pH ) = 0. In this 
case, low cost firms charge prices with positive probability in the interval p ∈ [p′, p
H
] for some 
ρL < p
′ < p
H
where β(p) = 0. The third line in equation (7) shows the distribution function 
of low cost prices in this case. In this case, we need that FL(p′) = FL(ρL) and fL(p) = 0 for 
all p ∈ (ρL, p′) and choose β(p¯), p¯, p′ such that the following three boundary conditions are 
satisfied: (9), (11) and β(p
H
) = 0. We call such an equilibrium a competitive gap equilibrium 
(see Fig. 5) as there is a region of prices that is set by low cost firms where consumers only buy 
if they know that this is the lowest price in the market. In the last part of the proof of Theorem 1
we show that such a competitive gap equilibrium must exist if none of the other non-reservation 
price equilibria exist. This finishes the description of the four-step procedure to construct an 
equilibrium.
The equilibrium construction outlined above is illustrated in Fig. 6. The Figure shows for 
given values of s, λ and α how the equilibrium configuration depends on the cost difference 
cH − cL. For relatively small values of λ, Fig. 6(a) shows there are three possible equilibrium 
configurations, depending on whether the cost difference is small, large or intermediate. If the 
cost difference is relatively small, there is a unique equilibrium without a gap in the low cost 
distribution. When cH is close to cL, the value of β(p) has to be close to 1 and in the limit, when 
cost uncertainty disappears, the Stahl (1989) equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium. If, on 
the other hand, the cost difference cH − cL is relatively large, then there exists a unique regular 
gap equilibrium. The value of β(p) has to be relatively low to satisfy the equilibrium conditions 
for such an equilibrium to exist. Finally, if the cost difference cH − cL is at intermediate values, 
a monopolistic gap equilibrium co-exists together with two regular gap equilibria.21 For larger 
values of λ, Fig. 6(b) distinguishes four possible equilibrium configurations, while equilibrium is 
21 This multiplicity of equilibria is genuine and we do not know of plausible equilibrium selection arguments that can 
be used in this context. Fershtman and Fishman (1992) use a stability argument to argue that one of the equilibria in their 
search model is unstable. It is difficult to see how a stability argument can be invoked in our context, as the behavior of 
consumers is not characterized by a single parameter as in their model, but by the function β(p).
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Fig. 6. β as a function of cost difference.
unique for each value of the cost difference. That Figure shows that a regular gap equilibrium may 
fail to exist if the cost difference cH − cL is relatively large and a competitive gap equilibrium 
emerges.
We end this Section discussing how our analysis may shed some light on the empirical obser-
vations we mentioned at the end of the Introduction. Numerically, one can compare for a given 
cost realization (i) the expected first price observation conditional on the price being accepted 
and (ii) the expected first price observation conditional on it not being accepted. De los Santos 
et al. (2012) observe that in their sample the first conditional expected price is larger than the 
second, and they rightly claim that this is inconsistent with RPE. For the parameter values used 
in Figs. 3–5, one can compute and compare both conditional expected prices to conclude that 
for the high cost realization these non-RPE are consistent with the findings of De los Santos et 
al. (2012): for Fig. 4 the respective numbers are 42.94 and 42.83, for Fig. 3 the numbers are 
50.81 and 49.83, while for Fig. 5 they are 45.19 and 45.11, respectively. Thus, we conclude that 
the observations of De los Santos et al. (2012) are not necessarily inconsistent with sequential 
search, although they are inconsistent with reservation price strategies.
Figs. 3, 4 and 5 show that non-RPE do not exhibit a simple monotone relationship between 
price and the probability of buying (or the probability of continuing to search). In a gap equi-
librium, the β(p) functions have an increasing segment, indicating that at higher prices in that 
segment the probability of non-shoppers buying at the firm that is visited first is higher (and thus 
the probability they continue searching is lower). Fig. 5 shows an extreme case of this where there 
is a region of prices that are set by low cost firms such that non-shoppers continue to search for 
sure, while at higher prices the probability of continuing to search is lower. Thus, these Figures 
indicate that the optimal search behavior may be highly nonmonotonic in price. De los Santos et 
al. (2012) empirically find that it is not the case that at higher prices, consumers are more likely 
to continue to search, while Honka and Chintagunta (2017) find that it is not the case that con-
sumers with more offers in their consideration sets tend to have higher offers. Again, our analysis 
shows that this does not rule out that consumers search sequentially.
Finally, equilibria where the low cost price distribution has a non-convex support may be 
interpreted as a search theoretic foundation for the reference price principle that is discussed in 
marketing (see the references in the Introduction). In our model, reference prices endogenously 
arise from the fact that consumers rationally infer that a certain low price will only be set when 
cost is low, and if the common cost is really low, then the chances of finding low prices are so 
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Fig. 7. Expected prices as a function of cost difference.
high that it is rational to continue searching for better deals. Thus, it is better for firms not to set 
prices just above these reference prices.
5. Comparative statics and comparing models
We are now in a position to compare the equilibrium outcomes of our model with two bench-
mark models, and to perform some numerical comparative statics analysis. On one hand, we use 
Stahl (1989) as a benchmark to show the implications of cost uncertainty. On the other hand, we 
use Dana (1994), or equivalently Janssen et al. (2011), as a benchmark for the outcome of RPE 
with cost uncertainty. As shown in Janssen et al. (2011), the expected price under RPE is larger 
than the weighted average of the expected price of the high and low cost equilibria as developed 
by Stahl (1989) and in that sense, consumers are worse off under cost uncertainty. In this Section 
we show that this result may well be reversed for non-RPE.
There are several effects that play a role when comparing the outcomes of non-reservation 
price equilibria with those of RPE. First, for a given upper bound p, lowering β(p) from an initial 
value of 1 (which is the value in the case of RPE) implies that there are more consumers making 
price comparisons. This implies firms tend to lower their prices as a reaction to the increased 
competition. A second effect is a direct consequence: as for a given upper bound expected prices 
will be lower, therefore searching for lower prices becomes more beneficial (as the expected 
prices after a search are lower), the upper bound has to be lower (as it is equal to the high-cost 
reservation price at which non-shoppers have to be indifferent between searching and buying). 
The third effect is that in a non-RPE, non-shoppers believe that cost is high after observing 
the upper bound, while in an RPE as in Dana (1994) and Janssen et al. (2011), the upper bound 
equals the weighted average of the reservation prices when cost is certainly low or certainly high. 
This effect increases the upper bound of the price distributions and thereby also the expected 
prices.
Fig. 7 shows the typical effect on ex ante expected price of these three effects. Expected 
price is a good measure of the surplus of the non-shoppers. When they continue to search, 
non-shoppers pay the search cost, but they also get to buy at the lowest of two prices. As in 
equilibrium, when they search twice they are indifferent between buying and searching, and the 
additional expected benefit of the possibility of buying at a lower price is exactly offset by the 
cost of the additional search. In both panels of Fig. 7, the average cost is taken to be 25 and the 
cost difference cH − cL, measured on the horizontal axis, varies between 0 (implying the cost is 
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known to be 25) and 50 (where cL = 0 and cH = 50). When the cost difference is 0, all models 
result in the same expected price. In the Stahl (1989) model where cost is known, the expected 
price is a fixed number larger than the cost level, where the fixed number depends on λ and s, 
but not on c. The ex ante expected price reported here for the Stahl model is the weighted costs 
plus this fixed number. This expected price is thus decreasing in the cost difference cH − cL, if 
α < 0.5 (as in Fig. 7). The expected price in Dana (1994) is known to be higher than the ex ante 
weighted average of the expected prices in the Stahl (1989) model. The Figures also show that the 
RPE analyzed in Dana (1994) does not exist for larger cost differences. Figs. 7(a) and 7(b) show 
that for smaller cost uncertainty, expected prices are even larger than the ones reported in Janssen 
et al. (2011). This is due to the fact that for small cost uncertainty, the third effect outlined above 
dominates. For small cost uncertainty, RPE tend to underestimate firms’ market power (measured 
by margins). The Figures also show, however, that for larger cost differences the expected price 
in a non-RPE becomes smaller and that it can even become smaller than the ex ante weighted 
average of expected prices in the Stahl (1989) model. For small values of λ, Fig. 7(a) shows that 
this difference can be as large as 10%! Cost uncertainty leads here to lower market prices due 
to the additional search effect resulting in increased competition between firms. In Fig. 7(b), for 
large cost differences, the expected price converges to the ex ante expected price in the Stahl 
(1989) model. For large cost uncertainty, RPE may thus overestimate the market power due to 
search frictions.
For better understanding of the mechanism behind the comparison with the Stahl (1989)
model, consider again Fig. 4 and keep in mind that Janssen et al. (2011) have shown that in the 
Stahl model with known cost expected price is simply a mark-up of s/(1 − τ) above marginal 
cost, with τ = ∫ 10 11+ λN1−λ ln 1+λ1−λ and N = 2. For the parameters considered in Fig. 4, this mark-up 
approximately equals 12 so that expected prices in the two states would be 22 and 52, respec-
tively. One can clearly see in Fig. 4 that the expected price (and margin) in the high cost state is 
significantly lower, while it is significantly higher in the low cost state. Low cost firms can raise 
prices by pretending to be high cost firms. In non-RPE this leads, however, to active consumer 
search from which the high cost firms suffer. The high cost margin reduces to 2.88 (from 12), 
while the low cost margin increases to 20.17. As α = 0.5 in Fig. 4, the average margin is smaller 
under cost uncertainty in a non-RPE. The potential strength of the additional search effect can be 
illustrated by comparing the same effects in Fig. 3 that is drawn for the same parameter values. In 
the monopolistic gap equilibrium in Fig. 3, prices are much higher because non-shoppers almost 
do not search (and when they do at prices just above p
H
this almost does not affect the high 
cost distribution, as at these prices it is anyway very likely that searching consumers return to the 
shop to buy).
In the different panels of Fig. 8, we perform a numerical comparative static analysis showing 
how expected price and the probability that non-shoppers search twice, which is given by
E(1 − β(p)) = α
ρH∫
p
H
(1 − β(p))fH (p)dp + (1 − α)
ρH∫
p
L
(1 − β(p))fL(p)dp,
changes with the changes in the different exogenous parameters s, λ and a.
The first two panels (8(a) and 8(b)) show the dependence on search cost. For small search cost, 
a large fraction of non-shoppers performs two searches and the expected price is close to the av-
erage marginal cost of 25. When the search cost increases from initially low levels, the expected 
price increases and the fraction of non-shoppers performing two searches decreases (giving firms 
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Fig. 8. Comparative statics.
more market power). At search cost levels close to 2, there are multiple gap equilibria, and it may 
be that the expected price is decreasing in search cost. When the search cost further increases, a 
no-gap equilibrium emerges and the probability of non-shoppers searching twice becomes very 
close to 0. Panel (8(b)) also shows that starting from an initially small search cost, non-shoppers 
will search less when the search cost increases. In this way, non-shoppers partially mitigate the 
increase in market power typically associated with higher search cost.
The middle two panels (8(c) and 8(d)) show the dependence on the fraction of shoppers. When 
λ is small, there are many non-shoppers and a no-gap equilibrium exists. In such an equilibrium, 
140 M.C.W. Janssen et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 172 (2017) 120–162
very few non-shoppers perform two searches and the expected price is high. When λ increases, 
the expected price decreases, but in the area where multiple equilibria exist, the difference in the 
expected price can be quite large as the fraction of non-shoppers performing two searches differs 
greatly between the different equilibria. When λ increases further, we enter the area where only 
competitive gap equilibria exist. In this case, increasing λ leads to a higher probability that low 
cost firms price in the area where β(p) = 0 and the average price increases slightly.
The last two panels (8(e) and 8(f)) show the dependence on the probability that the cost is 
high. When this probability is high, there is a no-gap equilibrium and consumers search very 
little, since there is a low probability of obtaining a substantially lower price. In this region the 
higher the α, the higher the expected price. For lower values of α, there is a monopolistic gap 
equilibrium with qualitatively similar properties. When α is sufficiently low, there are multiple 
gap equilibria and the incentives to search can be high, pushing the prices down. The expected 
price can be both increasing and decreasing in α depending on which of the regular gap equilibria 
is chosen.
6. Extensions
In this Section, we deal with two important extensions of our general analysis. The first relates 
to introducing more general forms of correlation between firms’ costs, the second relates to a first 
analysis of oligopoly markets with sequential search.
6.1. Introducing an idiosyncratic cost component
In this extension we slightly modify the model described in Section 2 by introducing idiosyn-
cratic cost shock in addition to the common cost shock we have analyzed so far. Suppose that 
each firm has a cost component κi , i = L, H , which is independent between the firms. Suppose 
that κH ≥ κL and the high cost state occurs with probability γ . The idiosyncratic cost shock is 
private information to the firm, and the common cost shock is, as before, known to both firms, 
but not to consumers. The total marginal cost of every firm is cij = ci + κj and we refer to the 
pricing strategy of such firm as Fij (p).
In Appendix C, we describe the analysis for the case where there is no uncertainty concerning 
the common cost component (the “pure idiosyncratic cost shock” case). The main take away 
from that analysis is that (for the same common cost component) a firm with a low idiosyncratic 
cost state randomizes prices over a support that is below and does not overlap with the support 
of the price distribution of a firm with a high idiosyncratic cost state.
Below we describe how we can use these results to combine them with the results we have de-
rived in this paper under common cost uncertainty. We first characterize the distributions FiH (p)
in the upper part of the support, i.e., for all p ≥ p
HH
. From Appendix C, we know that the firms 
with low idiosyncratic cost will not price in this area. Adapting equation (1), when setting price 
p firms with high idiosyncratic cost make a profit of⎡
⎢⎣λγ (1 − FiH (p))+ 1 − λ2 β(p)+ 1 − λ2 (1 − β(p))γ (1 − FiH (p))+
1 − λ
2
γ
p∫
p
(1 − β(p˜))fiH (p˜)dp˜
⎤
⎥⎦ (p − ciH )
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so that using the same technique as in the proof of Proposition 4, the distributions FiH (p) have 
to satisfy
− 2γ [1 − (1 − λ)β(p)]dFiH+[
(1 − λ)β ′(p)(1 − γ + γFiH )+ (1 − λ)β(p) p − ci
(p − ciH )2
]
dp = 0.
Solving for FiH (p) gives
FiH (p) =
2γ
√
1 − (1 − λ)β(p)− ∫ p
p
(1−γ )(1−λ)β ′(p˜)(p˜−ciH )2+(1−λ)β(p)(p−ciH )
(p˜−ciH )2√1−(1−λ)β(p˜) dp˜
2γ
√
1 − (1 − λ)β(p) . (12)
As in the pure common cost case studied in the main body of the paper, the upper bound p
is determined purely by high common cost considerations. The same is true here, but now we 
have to take into account that a firm with a high common and idiosyncratic cost component does 
not know whether the other firm in the market has a high or a low idiosyncratic cost component. 
Applying the result on the determination of the reservation price for the idiosyncratic case derived 
in Appendix C, we have
p = ρH = γEHH(p)+ (1 − γ )EHL(p)+ s,
where now EHH(p) is defined by probability distribution (12). To determine ρH , we now also 
need to have EHL(p).
Depending on which type of equilibrium we have, there are different cases to consider. For 
the no-gap equilibrium, we have that EHL(p) is determined by using (28) in Appendix C. This 
equilibrium holds if at prices p < p
HH
(which are set by both HL and LH firms) consumers 
prefer to buy rather than continue to search. Depending on the parameters, however, it may well 
be that consumers prefer to continue to search at such prices (which is in line with the regular or 
the monopolistic gap equilibrium in the common cost framework). If that is the case, there will 
be a gap (x, p
H
) in the FLH (p) distribution where β(p) = 0 with FHL(x) = 1 and β(x) = 1
such that consumers prefer to buy at prices p ≤ x.22
We conclude that it is entirely possible to extend the analysis in the main body of the paper 
and deal with situations where firms’ cost has a common and an idiosyncratic component. Fig. 9
shows that if we add idiosyncratic cost uncertainty, the expected market price can be both lower 
and higher than without this uncertainty. The impact of idiosyncratic cost uncertainty on expected 
prices is very different than the impact of common cost uncertainty, as there is no consumer 
learning. The main effect is through the fact that the low and high cost distributions are not 
overlapping and that the reservation price is based on a weighted average of the expected prices 
of these two distributions.
6.2. Oligopoly markets
It is not too difficult to reformulate our analysis to an oligopoly model by replacing sequen-
tial search with “newspaper search” a la Salop and Stiglitz (1977) and Dana (1994). Under 
22 The determination of x is slightly more complicated than in the common cost case as now after observing x the 
consumers should still update their beliefs taking into account that both LH and HL firms will choose x. LH firms 
should be indifferent between charging prices x and p
H
, while the HL firms should (at least weakly) prefer charging x. 
In these cases, to determine EHL(p) (to be able to determine ρH ), we should use (28), where piH is replaced by x.
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Fig. 9. Expected price in a model with idiosyncratic cost component.
newspaper search, a consumer pays a search cost only once to see all remaining prices. Thus, 
in both the duopoly model with sequential search and the oligopoly model with newspaper 
search, a consumer effectively has to take the decision whether or not to continue to search 
only once.
Staying in the sequential search paradigm, it is challenging to give full analytical character-
ization of non-RPE when there are more than two firms in the market. The difficulty is due to 
the fact that depending on the prices observed, consumers may perform a different number of 
searches, creating complications for solving for the price distribution of firms. Nevertheless, the 
following result on the optimal search behavior of consumers helps to considerably reduce the 
complexities in analyzing certain types of equilibria under oligopoly. In this result we denote by 
p(t) the price a non-shopper observes in search round t .
Proposition 5. Suppose the consumer was indifferent between continuing to search or buy-
ing after the first price observation p(1) and fH (p) > fL(p) for all p ∈ P(0,1). Then if the 
consumer continued, she stops searching after the second price observation p(2) and buys at 
min{p(1), p(2)}.
There are two interesting aspects about this Proposition. First, if a non-shopper observes two 
prices p(1) and p(2), with p(1) < p(2), then the Proposition says the consumer will stop searching 
and go back to the first firm if the high cost density is larger than the low cost density. Thus, 
going back to previously sampled firms before all firms are searched may well be consistent 
with a sequential search. De los Santos et al. (2012) have observed that consumers do go back 
to previously sampled firms before having visited all firms. This is inconsistent with reservation 
price strategies, as they noted, but not necessarily with sequential search.
Second, if in a non-RPE we have that fH(p) > fL(p) in the price region where β(p) < 1, 
then we know that non-shoppers will never search beyond the second firm, and the profit function 
under oligopoly can be written as
π(p|ci) =
⎡
⎢⎣λ(1 − Fi(p))N−1 + 1 − λ
N
β(p)+ 1 − λ
N
(1 − β(p))(1 − Fi(p)) +
1 − λ
N − 1
N − 1
N
p∫
p
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜
⎤
⎥⎦(p − ci)
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Fig. 10. Equilibrium price distributions and stopping probability for N = 3.
so that the differential equation which has to be solved to find the distribution functions reduces 
to
−2
[
1 + λN(N − 1)
2 (1 − λ) (1 − Fi)
N−2 − β(p)
]
dFi +
[
β ′(p)Fi + β(p) p − ci
(p − ci)2
]
dp = 0.
(13)
This differential equation can be solved numerically, and it can be checked whether fH(p) >
fL(p) indeed holds for all prices in the price region where β(p) < 1. In Fig. 10, we illustrate the 
distribution functions that solve (13) for particular parameter values. It can be checked that the 
condition on the density functions is satisfied.
In Section 4, we have seen that in the equilibria with a gap in the low cost price distribu-
tion (e.g. one depicted in Fig. 3), fH (p) < fL(p) holds for prices close to pH . This implies 
that Proposition 5 does not hold. In that case, it may well be that with N firms in the market, 
consumers search three or more firms before going back to the lowest price in their sample. 
This makes the analysis, however, quite tedious, and an analytical treatment of non-RPE is then 
certainly not feasible.
7. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have considered consumer search markets where firms’ underlying com-
mon cost is unknown to consumers. If consumers do not know the prices different firms charge, 
it is natural that they also do not know the underlying cost. We have argued that in this en-
vironment of cost uncertainty, the standard RPE considered in the consumer search literature 
suffer from severe limitations. It was already known that RPE do not always exist, but we add 
that RPE implicitly assume specific out-of-equilibrium beliefs that do not satisfy standard game 
theoretic refinements. We characterize non-RPE that do not depend on specific assumptions re-
garding out-of-equilibrium beliefs and show that these equilibria always exist. Non-RPE may 
provide a significantly different assessment of the market power firms derive from search fric-
tions.
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In non-RPE, non-shoppers are indifferent between buying and continuing to search over a 
range of prices. As prices in this range are set with positive probability, these non-RPE have 
active search with positive probability in equilibrium. Thus, we extend the Rothschild (1974)
finding by showing in a model with endogenous price setting that in equilibrium firms price in 
such a way that consumers do not choose reservation price strategies. The fact that consumers 
rationally search more with cost uncertainty in non-RPE explains why market power may be 
overestimated in RPE. The additional search has a quantitatively important pro-competitive effect 
on prices.
Our results on non-RPE also have important consequences for the empirical literature on 
consumer search models that has recently taken off. Non-RPE may explain the observations 
of De los Santos et al. (2012) and Honka and Chintagunta (2017), as in these equilibria (i) 
consumers may rationally continue to search at lower prices, while they buy at higher prices 
and (ii) consumers may stop searching and buy at a previously visited store, before they have 
observed all prices in the market (see our oligopoly extension in Section 6). Moreover, the price 
distributions of non-RPE are quite different from the regular price distributions found in RPE. 
It would be interesting to see whether these price distributions provide a good fit with empirical 
data.
As a first inquiry into non-RPE, we have analyzed a stylized model limiting the immediate 
applicability of this paper to real world markets.23 In extensions, we have shown that some of 
the equilibria extend to oligopoly markets, and, importantly, we have dealt with markets where 
firms’ cost consists of an idiosyncratic and a common cost component. Obviously, in an oligopoly 
framework one may want to consider a continuum of possible cost states. Such an extension of 
the present paper would be important in environments where the firms’ cost is determined by an 
upstream firm (who can choose a continuum of different price levels). In such an environment, 
Janssen and Shelegia (2015a) have characterized interesting properties of RPE, but they also 
show such equilibria do not always exist. Non-RPE would solve this non-existence issue and 
it is natural to inquire into the qualitative properties of such equilibria. Bagwell and Lee (2014)
provide such an analysis for the case where cost has an idiosyncratic component only. An obvious 
next step is to see whether our analysis on learning about a common cost component can be 
combined with their analysis.
One important issue that needs to be addressed in the generalizations to oligopoly markets 
is how consumer inferences after observing two (or more) prices interact with the consumer 
search decisions. In the oligopoly extension analyzed in this paper, we dealt with the easiest of 
different possible cases that can arise. In general, however, different possible search behaviors 
interact in a complicated way with the incentive of firms to choose different prices. This paper 
made a first step analyzing non-RPE. There are many theoretical and empirical challenges that 
lie ahead.
Appendix A. Proofs of lemmas, propositions and corollaries
Proposition 1. If cH − cL is sufficiently large, or s is sufficiently small an RPE does not exist.
23 Parakhonyak and Sobolev (2015) have taken a different line and introduce model uncertainty into the consumer 
search framework. Consumers do not update beliefs, but choose a stopping rule that minimizes their losses relative to a 
Bayesian consumer. They show that in such a framework, consumers also choose a non-reservation price strategy and 
that firms choose prices in a similar way as we have analyzed here.
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Proof. Our proof relies on some facts first derived in Janssen et al. (2011), which we first repli-
cate here. The expected price E(p|ci) is given by
E(p|ci) =
ρ∫
p
pf (p|ci)dp = ci +
1∫
0
(p − ci)dF (p|ci).
Introducing
z ≡ 1 − F(p|ci) =
(
1 − λ
2λ
ρ − ci
p − ci
)
,
we have that
p − ci = ρ − ci
1 + 2λ1−λz
.
This allows us to rewrite expression E(p|ci) as
E(p|ci) = (1 − γ )ci + γρ,
where γ ≡ ∫ 10 11+ 2λ1−λ z dz ∈ [0, 1]. As this also yields E(p|ρ) = (1 − γ )E(c|ρ) + γρ, combining 
with ρ = E(p|ρ) + s, the reservation price is implicitly defined by
ρ = E(c|ρ)+ s
1 − γ (14)
so that
E(p|ci) = ci + γ1 − γ s + γ [E(c|ρ)− ci] . (15)
Note that a high cost firm charges prices p ≥ cH , and therefore in any RPE it must be the case 
that ρ ≥ cH . From the characterization of RPE it is clear that all prices p ∈ [pL, ρ] are in the 
support of the equilibrium price distributions. Consider then a consumer who observes a price p
= cH − ε for some ε > 0. From the expression pL = 2λ1+λci + 1−λ1+λ p¯ and the fact that as shown 
in (14) p¯ = ρ = E(c|ρ) + s1−γ ≤ cH + s1−γ it follows that pL < cH for cH − cL sufficiently 
large. Thus, observing a price p = cH − ε a consumer must believe that this price is set by a low 
cost firm. If the consumer continues to search the expected cost of buying is certainly smaller 
than E(p|cL) + s. Then, from (15) the expected price conditional on cost being low equals
E(p|cL) = cL + γ1 − γ s + γ
[
E(c|p¯)− cL
]
.
As E(c|p¯) < cH , it is certainly optimal to continue searching after observing such a price (con-
tradicting the reservation price property) if
cL + γ1 − γ s + γ (cH − cL)+ s < cH − ε.
This reduces to
1
1 − γ s + ε < (1 − γ ) (cH − cL) .
It is clear that for a given γ and s, this inequality holds for cH − cL being sufficiently large, 
or that for a given γ and cH − cL this inequality holds for some ε > 0 for s being sufficiently 
small. 
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Proposition 2. For any search cost s > 0, if cH − cL is sufficiently large, then consumers search 
with positive probability in any PBE with continuous Fi(·).
Proof. Suppose there is no active search, i.e. β(p) = 1 for all {p : p ∈ SuppFL∪SuppFH }. In the 
proof of Proposition 1, we showed that for any s if cH − cL is large enough we have ρL < pH for 
ρL ≤ E(p|cL) + s.24 Moreover, as β(p) = 1 for all p ≤ ρL the price distribution FL(p) cannot 
have any mass points at these prices. As for all p ∈ SuppFL ∪ SuppFH with p < pH consumers 
infer that cost is low, prices p ∈ (ρL, pH ) cannot be part of an equilibrium without active search. 
As there cannot be a mass point in the high cost price distribution at p
H
(as otherwise high cost 
firms will undercut), there cannot be a masspoint in the low cost price distribution either (as 
consumers would infer that cost is low with probability 1). This implies that FL(ρL) = FL(pH )
and because β(ρL) = β(pH ) = 1 we would obtain that{
λ[1 − FL(ρL)] + 1 − λ2
}
(ρL − cL) =
{
λ[1 − FL(ρL)] + 1 − λ2
}
(p
H
− cL)
which is not possible since p
H
> ρL. 
Proposition 3. All perfect Bayesian equilibria in which non-shoppers buy with probability one 
in the first search round and in which Fi(p) is continuous, do not satisfy the D1 logic.
Proof. As only non-shoppers buy at the upper bound, in an equilibrium without active search 
the profits of low and high cost firms are given by πL = 1−λ2 (ρ − cL) and πH = 1−λ2 (ρ − cH ), 
respectively. If non-shoppers buy with probability β(p) after observing an out-of-equilibrium 
price p = ρ + 
, for small 
 > 0, then the deviating firm sells to 1−λ2 β(p) consumers and makes 
a profit of πi = 1−λ2 β(p)(p − ci), i = L, H as shoppers will not buy at these high deviation 
prices. This deviation profit is larger than the equilibrium profit if
β(p) >
ρ − ci
p − ci .
Thus, for an out-of-equilibrium price p = ρ + 
, for small enough 
 > 0, the set {qi ∈ Bi(p) :
(p − ci)qi ≥ πi∗i } = ( 1−λ2 ρ−cip−ci , 1−λ2 ]. As the lower bound of this set is decreasing in ci for all 
p > ρ, {qi ∈ Bi(p) : (p−cL)qi ≥ πi∗L and p > ρ} ⊂ {qi ∈ Bi(p) : (p−ci)qH ≥ πi∗H and p > ρ}. 
The D1 refinement thus requires that Pr(cL|p) = 0 for all p > ρ.
The remaining part of the proof is given in the main text just above the Proposition. 
Lemma 1. In PBE with continuous Fi(p), thus, in any non-RPE, pL = pH ≡ p.
Proof. If the upper bounds are not equal, it must be the case that pH > pL, or vice versa. 
As the argument in both cases is identical, we only consider the case where pH > pL. Due 
to the fact that the price distributions do not have mass points, it must be the case that in a left 
neighborhood of pH high cost firms charge prices with strictly positive probability. For any small 
24 Although formally this result was shown only for RPE, it is clear that in any equilibrium without active search 
(i.e., where consumers buy immediately at the first search) it must hold . Indeed, it follows form the fact that p
L
=
2λ
1+λ ci + 1−λ1+λ p¯ , which in turn follows from the equal-profit condition in the case when all consumers buy at pL and p
with probability one (which is true in all equilibria without active search) and the fact that p
H
≥ cH .
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ε > 0 consider then the interval 
(
pH − ε,pH
)
. If a low cost firm would not charge prices in this 
interval, consumers would know that cost is high after observing prices in this interval. Given 
that consumers are (at least) indifferent between buying and not buying at pH (as, if consumers 
prefer to continue to search after observing pH , no firm would ever charge pH ), they strictly 
prefer to buy at prices in the interval 
(
pH − ε,pH
)
. But then low cost firms would prefer to set 
prices in this interval as well instead of charging pL. Thus, pL = pH . 
Proposition 4. If F(p) is a price distribution in a non-RPE, then it should be of the following 
form:
Fi(p) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2
√
1−(1−λ)β(p)−∫ pp (1−λ)β(p)(p−ci )(
p˜−ci
)2√1−(1−λ)β(p˜) dp˜
2
√
1−(1−λ)β(p) if p ∈ P(0,1)
1 − 1−λ2λ
[
β(p)
p−ci
p−ci − 1 −
∫ p
p
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜
]
if p ∈ P1
1 − 1−λ1+λ
[
β(p)
p−ci
p−ci −
∫ p
p
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜
]
if p ∈ P0
Proof. Assuming the function β(p) is differentiable, equation (6) can be rewritten as
−2 [1 − (1 − λ)β(p)]fi(p)+ (1 − λ)β ′(p)Fi(p) = −(1 − λ)β(p) p − ci
(p − ci)2
by taking the derivative of both sides of the equality sign. This equation can be explicitly written 
as a differential equation:
−2 [1 − (1 − λ)β(p)]dFi + [(1 − λ)β ′(p)Fi + (1 − λ)β(p) p − ci
(p − ci)2
]
dp = 0. (16)
As
−2∂
[
1 − (1 − λ)β(p)]
∂p
=
∂
[
(1 − λ)β ′(p)Fi + (1 − λ)β(p) p−ci
(p−ci )2
]
∂Fi
this is an inexact linear differential equation. However, it can be made exact by dividing (16) by √
1 − (1 − λ)β(p):
−2√1 − (1 − λ)β(p)dFi +
[
(1 − λ)β ′(p)Fi + (1 − λ)β(p) p−ci
(p−ci )2
]
√
1 − (1 − λ)β(p) dp = 0.
The solution to this exact differential function is a function Z(Fi, p) = Ci (where Ci is an in-
tegration constant) with ∂Z
∂p
=
[
(1−λ)β ′(p)Fi+(1−λ)β(p) p−ci(
p−ci
)2
]
√
1−(1−λ)β(p) and 
∂Z
∂Fi
= √1 − (1 − λ)β(p). It 
follows that the solution Z(Fi, p) is given by
−2Fi
√
1 − (1 − λ)β(p)+
∫
(1 − λ)β(p)(p − ci)
(p − ci)2 √1 − (1 − λ)β(p)
dp +Ci = 0.
This equation can be solved explicitly for Fi(p), to yield (7), where the integration constant Ci
is found by setting Fi(p) = 1.
If β(p) = 1 or β(p) = 0 in an interval of prices (p̂, p˜), then the equilibrium price distribution 
can be simply directly calculated from (6). 
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Corollary 3. In any non-RPE, for all p < p, FL(p) ≥ FH (p) and whenever 0 < FH(p) < 1, 
FL(p) >FH(p).
Proof. From the previous Proposition, it follows that FH (p) < FL(p) if, and only if,
(1−λ)β(p)(p−cH )
(p−cH )2√1−(1−λ)β(p) >
(1−λ)β(p)(p−cL)
(p−cL)2√1−(1−λ)β(p) for all p. This is the case if
(p − cH )2(p − cL) < (p − cL)2(p − cH ).
This can be rewritten as
(cH − cL)p2 − ((cH − cL)pp + cLcH (cL − cH ) < 0
or p2 − pp − cLcH < 0, which is definitely the case as p < p. 
Lemma 2. Let p∗ be such that β(p∗) = 1 and for any sufficiently small 
 > 0 β(p∗ + 
) < 1. 
Suppose that p∗ is in the interior of the support of Fi(p), i = L, H . Then in equilibrium it must 
be that β ′(p∗) = 0.
Proof. Suppose, β ′(p∗) < 0. Denote fi = fi(p∗ − ε) − fi(p∗ + ε). Then, since
fi(p) =
(1 − λ)β ′(p)Fi(p)+ (1 − λ)β(p) p−ci
(p−ci )2
2
[
1 − (1 − λ)β(p)] ,
we have
fi = 12
⎛
⎝β(p)(p − ci)(1 − λ)
(p∗ − ε − ci)2λ −
(1 − λ)
(
β(p)(p−ci )
(p∗+ε−ci )2 + Fi(p
∗ + ε)β ′(p∗ + ε)
)
1 − (1 − λ)β(p∗ + ε)
⎞
⎠=
= 1
2
⎛
⎝β(p)(p − ci)(1 − λ)
(p∗ − ε − ci)2λ −
(1 − λ)
(
β(p)(p−ci )
(p∗+ε−ci )2
)
1 − (1 − λ)β(p∗ + ε)
⎞
⎠− Fi(p∗ + ε)β ′(p∗ + ε)
1 − (1 − λ)β(p∗ + ε) (17)
As FL(p) > FH(p) and 
{
p−ci
(p−ci )2
}′
ci
> 0, we get that fL, fH > 0 for any ε. Now we take a 
limit with respect to ε.
lim
ε→0fi = 0 + limε→0−
Fi(p
∗ + ε)β ′(p∗ + ε)
1 − (1 − λ)β(p∗ + ε) (18)
The first term in equation (17) approaches zero when ε approaches zero, while the second is 
strictly positive and bounded below. So we can conclude that as FL(p) >FH(p), we can always 
find sufficiently small ε, such that fL >fH .
Denote
ai = (1 − λ)β(p)(p − ci)
Then
aL
(p − cL)2 <
aH
(p − cH )2
M.C.W. Janssen et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 172 (2017) 120–162 149
which implies that fL < fH for prices higher than p∗. This gives fL(p
∗−ε)
(1−α)fL(p∗−ε)+αfH (p∗−ε) =
fL(p
∗+ε)+fL
(1−α)fL(p∗+ε)+αfH (p∗+ε)+(1−α)fL+αfH >
fL(p
∗+ε)
(1−α)fL(p∗+ε)+αfH (p∗+ε) . Thus, if consumers are in-
different at p∗ + ε, they must strictly prefer to continue searching at p∗ − ε, which can not be 
the case. Therefore, β ′(p∗) = 0 (since it cannot be greater than 0). 
Proposition 5. Suppose the consumer was indifferent between continuing to search or buy-
ing after the first price observation p(1) and fH (p) > fL(p) for all p ∈ P(0,1). Then if the 
consumer continued, she stops searching after the second price observation p(2) and buys at 
min{p(1), p(2)}.
Proof. Consider a consumer who has observed two prices p(1) and p(2). Given that the consumer 
was indifferent after observing p(1), the optimal stopping rule for the first round gives
w1(p
(1))[	L(p(1))− s] + [1 −w1(p(1))][	H(p(1))− s] = 0,
where
w1(p
(1)) = (1 − α)fL(p
(1))
(1 − α)fL(p(1))+ αfH (p(1)) .
After observing p(2) the decision of the consumer is determined by the sign of
w2(p
(1), p(2))[	L(p(1))− s] + [1 −w1(p(1), p(2))][	H(p(1))− s],
where
w2(p
(1), p(2)) = (1 − α)fL(p
(1))fL(p(2))
(1 − α)fL(p(1))fL(p(2))+ αfH (p(1))fH (p(2)) .
Note, that if w2(p(1), p(2)) < w1(p(1)) this sign is always negative and the consumer prefers to 
stop. This is the case if
(1 − α)fL(p(1))
(1 − α)fL(p(1))+ αfH (p(1)) >
(1 − α)fL(p(1))fL(p(2))
(1 − α)fL(p(1))fL(p(2))+ αfH (p(1))fH (p(2)) ,
which can be rewritten as
(1 − α)2fL(p(1))fL(p(2))+ (1 − α)αfL(p(1))fH (p(1))fH (p(2)) >
(1 − α)2fL(p(1))fL(p(2))+ (1 − α)αfL(p(1))fH (p(1))fL(p(2)),
and reduces to
fH (p
(2)) > fL(p
(2)). 
Proposition A.1. In any non-reservation price equilibrium,
β ′(p) ≡ lim
p↑p
β(p)− β(p)
p − p = −
β(p)
p − cL
and β(p) < 1.
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Proof. As it follows from equations (8) and (9), non-shoppers have to be indifferent between 
buying and continuing to search after observing p.
From Lemma 1, it follows that in the interval (p − ε,p) both types of firms charge prices with 
strictly positive probability. By differentiating (5) with respect to p and setting fL(p) = 0 and 
FL(p) = 1 we obtain
β ′(p)(p − cL)+ β(p) = 0,
which can only be the case when β(p) < 1. 
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 1
Here, we prove the existence of equilibrium (Theorem 1) in several lemmas and a final main 
result. In general, and as explained in the main text, we need to prove that the two functional equa-
tions characterizing the distribution functions and the optimality condition for the search rule of 
non-shoppers, i.e., equations (7) and (10), have an economically meaningful solution. Thus, the 
distribution functions should be well-defined, i.e. the densities are positive, and 0 ≤ β(p) ≤ 1. 
If β(p) = 0 it should be optimal for non-shoppers to continue searching after observing these 
prices, while at prices where β(p) = 1 non-shoppers should prefer to buy. In addition, two 
boundary conditions need to be satisfied and we have two parameters to satisfy them: p and 
β(p). First, we need that fL(p) = 0, which implies that 
∫ p
0 FH (x)dx = s. The second boundary 
condition is different for different parameter values. For the purpose of formulating this second 
boundary condition, implicitly define p0 ≤ pH as πL(p0) = πL(pH ), or⎡
⎢⎣λ(1 − FL(p0))+ 1 − λ2 + 1 − λ2
p
H∫
p0
fi(p˜)dp˜ + 1 − λ2
p∫
p
H
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜
⎤
⎥⎦×
(p0 − cL) =⎡
⎢⎣λ(1 − FL(pH ))+ 1 − λ2 − 1 − λ2 (1 − β(pH ))FL(pH )
+ 1 − λ
2
p∫
p
H
(1 − β(p˜))fL(p˜)dp˜
⎤
⎥⎦ (p
H
− cL).
That is, p0 is the largest price smaller than pH that makes low cost firms indifferent between (i) 
setting this price and having uninformed consumers immediately buy at this price and not buying 
for sure at any price in the interval (p0, pH ) and (ii) choosing pH and having uninformed con-
sumers buying with probability β(p
H
). To see that p0 is uniquely defined, consider the following 
two cases. If low cost firms do not charge prices in the interval (p0, pH ) with positive probabil-
ity, then the demand at p0 is independent of p0 and thus the profit expression is increasing in p0. 
In that case, if β(p
H
) = 1, then p0 = pH , while if β(pH ) < 1, then p0 < pH . If, on the other 
hand, with positive probability low cost firms do charge prices in the interval (p0, pH ), then the 
profit at p0 can be written as
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πL(p0) =
⎡
⎢⎣1 + λ2 (1 − FL(p0))+ 1 − λ2 FL(pH )+ 1 − λ2
p∫
p
H
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜
⎤
⎥⎦
× (p0 − cL),
which using (3) for β(p0) = 1, can be written as
1 + λ
2
⎛
⎜⎝1 − λ2λ
⎡
⎢⎣β(p) p − cL
p0 − ci − 1 −
p∫
p0
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜
⎤
⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎠ (p0 − cL)
+
⎛
⎜⎝1 − λ2 FL(pH )+ 1 − λ2
p∫
p
H
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜
⎞
⎟⎠ (p0 − cL),
or
1 − λ2
4λ
⎡
⎢⎣β(p) (p − cL)−
⎛
⎜⎝1 +
p∫
p0
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜
⎞
⎟⎠ (p0 − cL)
⎤
⎥⎦
+
⎛
⎜⎝1 − λ2 FL(pH )+ 1 − λ2
p∫
p
H
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜
⎞
⎟⎠ (p0 − cL),
which is clearly increasing in p0.
The second boundary condition can then be stated as follows.
(i) If ρL ≥ pH , then β ′(p) = 0 when p is such that β(p) = 1 (Lemma 2);(ii) If β(p) < 1 for all p ∈ [p
H
, p], then p0 = ρL;
(iii) If ρL < pH and there is an interval [x, y] of prices p such that β(p) = 1 for all p ∈ [x, y], 
then lim
p↓yβ
′(p) = 0 (Lemma 2), and p0 = ρ.
To simplify notation, we rewrite the distribution functions as
Fi(p) =
2g(p)− ∫ p
p
ai
(x−ci )2g(x)dx
2g(p)
i = L,H, (19)
where g(p) = √1 − (1 − λ)β(p) and ai = (1 −λ)β(p)(p−ci), and proceed as follows. We first 
note that (10) and (7) only need to hold in an interval of prices where β(p) < 1 and that this is 
a subset of (ρL, p]. Lemma A.1 shows that this implies that fL(p) and fH (p) are either both 
positive or both negative over the relevant interval. We next show that fH(p) > 0. Together with 
Lemma A.1, this shows that if the indifference equation for consumers has a solution, then the 
distribution functions in (7) are well-defined, increasing functions.
Lemma A.1. For any p ∈ P(0,1), fL(p) · fH (p) ≥ 0.
Proof. As 	L(ρL) =
∫ ρL
0 Fi(x)dx = 	H(ρH ) =
∫ ρH
0 Fi(x)dx = s, and 	i(p) are increasing 
functions it follows that 	L(p) > s and 	H(p) < s for all ρL < p < ρH . As (10) can be rewrit-
ten as
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(1 − α)fL(p)
(1 − α)fL(p)+ αfH (p)(	L(p)− s)+
αfH (p)
(1 − α)fL(p)+ αfH (p)(	H (p)− s) = 0
it follows that both the weights (1−α)fL(p)
(1−α)fL(p)+αfH (p) and 
αfH (p)
(1−α)fL(p)+αfH (p) have to be of the same 
sign, which can only be the case if fL(p) and fH (p) have the same sign. 
Lemma A.2. For all p ∈ [max(ρL, pH ), p] ∩ P(0,1), fi(p) > 0, i = L, H .
Proof. As the function β(p) is differentiable, equation (6) can be rewritten as
−2 [1 − (1 − λ)β(p)]fi(p)+ (1 − λ)β ′(p)Fi(p) = −(1 − λ)β(p) p − ci
(p − ci)2
,
which at p reduces to
−2 [1 − (1 − λ)β(p)]fi(p) = −(1 − λ)[ β(p)
p − ci + β
′(p)
]
.
As the RHS of this expression equals 0 for ci = cL, the RHS is clearly negative for ci = cH for 
any choice of 0 < β(p) < 1. Thus, fH (p) > 0. By continuity, there exists ε > 0 such that for 
all p ∈ [p − ε, p] fH (p) > 0. Then, by Lemma A.1 fL(·) is also positive in the interior of this 
interval. Moreover, Lemma A.1 implies that if fL(·) and fH (·) change sign it must happen at 
the same price, which we denote as q ∈ [max(ρL, pH ), p]. By differentiating (7) and taking the 
ratio of the derivatives, we obtain
(p − cH )(q − cL)2
(q − cH )2(p − cL) =
FH (q)
FL(q)
.
Note, that the LHS of this expression is larger than 1 (since q < p), while by Corollary 3 the 
RHS is smaller than 1. Therefore, there is no such q and both densities must be positive. 
Thus, it directly follows from Lemma A.1 and A.2 that both density functions have to be 
positive for all p ∈ [max(ρL, pH ), p] ∩ P(0,1). As for all other prices β(p) = 0 or β(p) = 1, the 
density functions are positive for all prices.
We also need that consumers prefer to buy as long as β(p) = 1. The proof is a simple 
adaptation of a proof given by Dana (1994) that in a reservation price equilibrium uninformed 
consumers strictly prefer to buy at all prices in the support of the price distribution of the high 
cost firm that are strictly smaller than the reservation price.
Lemma A.3. If β(p) = 1 on a certain interval [x, y] and uninformed consumers weakly prefer 
buying to continuing searching at p = y, then these consumers strictly prefer buying to continu-
ing searching at p ∈ [x, y).
Proof. If β(p) = 1, then
fH (p)
fL(p)
= (p − cH )
2(p − cL)
(p − cL)2(p − cH ) .
This expression is decreasing in p. Thus, after observing a larger price, updating beliefs results 
in uninformed consumers believing it is more likely that cost is high. The expected pay-off of 
continuing to search is thus larger at larger prices. At the same time, the pay-off of buying at a 
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higher price decreases. Thus, if a consumer is indifferent between the two options at p = x, then 
she must strictly prefer buying at p < x. 
We also need that along the equilibrium path we construct, consumers prefer to continue 
searching when β(p) = 0. This is, however, trivial, as β(p) = 0 only occurs along the equilib-
rium path when ρL < p < pH , but in that case consumers infer that it is only low cost firms that 
charge such prices, and non-shoppers prefer to search on as these prices are above ρL.
The next five lemmas establish that our system can be rewritten into five proper differential 
equations and invoke the Pickard–Lindelof theorem of differential equations to show that the 
system has a (mathematical) solution that it is locally unique. To make sure that the conditions 
of this theorem apply, we first need to establish some properties of the function g′(p).
Lemma A.4. The solution to the indifference equation (10) can be written as
g′(p) =
(1 − α) aL2(p−cL)2g(p) (	L(p)− s)+ α
aH
2(p−cH )2g(p) (	H (p)− s)
(1 − α)FL(p)(	L(p)− s)+ αFH (p)(	H (p)− s) . (20)
Proof. Taking the derivative of (19) gives
fi(p) = 1
g(p)
(
ai
2(p − ci)2g(p) − Fi(p)g
′(p)
)
.
Then the optimal stopping rule can be rewritten as
0 =
(1 − α)
(
aL
2(p−cL)2g(p) − FL(p)g
′(p)
)
(	L(p)− s)
(1 − α)
(
aL
2(p−cL)2g(p) − FL(p)g′(p)
)
+ α
(
aH
2(p−cH )2g(p) − FH (p)g′(p)
)
+
α
(
aH
2(p−cH )2g(p) − FH (p)g
′(p)
)
(	H (p)− s)
(1 − α)
(
aL
2(p−cL)2g(p) − FL(p)g′(p)
)
+ α
(
aH
2(p−cH )2g(p) − FH (p)g′(p)
) ,
which can easily be rewritten as the equation in the statement of the Lemma. 
We proceed with some facts about the function g′(p). Define g′(p) = A(p)
B(p)
, where
A(p) ≡ (1 − α) aL
2(p − cL)2g(p)(	L(p)− s)+ α
aH
2(p − cH )2g(p)(	H (p)− s) (21)
and
B(p) ≡ (1 − α)FL(p)(	L(p)− s)+ αFH (p)(	H (p)− s). (22)
Lemma A.5. The equation A(p) = 0 has at most one root on Q = {p : 	L(p) > s}.
Proof. From the definition of A(p) it follows that A(p) = 0 if, and only if,
α(s −	H(p))
(1 − α)(	L(p)− s) =
aL
(p−cL)2
aH
(p−cH )2
= (p − cH )
2(p − cL)
(p − cL)2(p − cH ) .
Note that the denominator of the LHS is always positive. For all prices p such that 	H(p) ≤ s
the numerator is also positive and the LHS is decreasing, while the RHS is increasing in p. 
154 M.C.W. Janssen et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 172 (2017) 120–162
Thus, there is at most one p where A(p) = 0. Moreover, for all p such that 	H(p) > s we have 
A(p) > 0, so there is no solution of A(p) = 0 for these prices. 
Lemma A.6. For all p ∈ Q = {p : 	L(p) > s} such that A(p) > 0 we have B(p) > 0.
Proof. Note that for all p such that 	H(p) ≥ s we have both A(p) > 0 and B(p) > 0. Now, 
consider prices such that 	H(p) < s. Then, A(p) > 0, if and only if,
(1 − α)(	L(p)− s)
α(s −	H(p)) >
aH
(p−cH )2
aL
(p−cL)2
= (p − cL)
2(p − cH )
(p − cH )2(p − cL) . (23)
Similarly, B(p) > 0, if and only if,
(1 − α)(	L(p)− s)
α(s −	H(p)) >
FH (p)
FL(p)
. (24)
The LHS of (23) and (24) are identical; as the RHS of (23) is larger than 1, while by Corollary 3
the RHS of (24) is smaller than 1, the statement follows. 
Now note, that if ρL ≥ pH then due to Lemma 2 it follows from Lemmas A.5 and A.6 that 
B(p) > 0 for all p = [ρL, p]. The next lemma establishes the same result for the case where 
ρL < pH
.
Lemma A.7. Suppose ρL < pH . Then B(p) > 0 for all p ∈ P(0,1).
Proof. Note that
B ′(p) = (1 − α)fL(p)[	L(p)− s] + αfH (p)[	H(p)− s] + (1 − α)FL(p)2 + αFH (p)2.
As p ∈ P(0,1) we have that the sum of the first two terms must be equal to zero due to (10). 
Thus, B ′(p) > 0. Note, that B(p
H
) ≥ 0 as FH(pH ) = 0. Thus, as P(0,1) ⊆ SuppFH we get that 
B(p) > 0 on this set. 
In the proof of the Theorem, we use the fact that the system of differential equations (7)
and (10) has a unique solution. To this end, we prove in the next Lemma that this is the case by 
applying the Pickard–Lindelof theorem.
Lemma A.8. For any p1 the system of differential equations given by (7) and (10) with boundary 
values 	i(p1), Fi(p1), β(p1), i = L, H such that
(1 − α)FL(p1)(	L(p1)− s)+ αFH (p1)(	H (p1 − s) > 0
β(p1) ≤ 1
has a unique solution in a neighborhood of p1.
Proof. To apply the Pickard–Lindelof theorem, we need to rewrite our system in the form where 
the derivatives of certain functions are expressed as functions of these functions themselves. 
We do this in the following way: we define a function 	i(p) =
∫ p
p
Fi(p)dp, so that 	′i (p) =
Fi(p), and a function zi(p) =
∫ p
0
(1−λ)β(p)(p−ci )
(x−ci )2g(x) dx, so that z
′
i (p) = − (1−λ)β(p)(p−ci )(p−ci )2g(p) . Using 
these transformations, we can rewrite our system as
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z′i (p) = −
(1 − λ)β(p)(p − ci)
(p − ci)2g(p) , i = L,H ;
	′i (p) =
2g(p)− zi(p)
2g(p)
, i = L,H ;
and
g′(p) = −
(1 − α) aL
(p−cL)2 (	L(p)− s)+ α
aH
(p−cH )2 (	H (p)− s)
(1 − α) (zL(p)− 2g(p)) (	L(p)− s)+ α (zH (p)− 2g(p)) (	H (p)− s) ,
whenever g(p) >
√
λ (β(p) < 1). Note that the expression for g′(p) is equivalent to (21) and 
that g′(p) = 0 if g(p) = √λ.
To apply the Pickard–Lindelof theorem, we need that the RHS of this system of differential 
equations is Lipschitz-continuous with respect to (g, zi, 	i), i = L, H .
Denoting bi = − (1−λ)β(p)(p−ci )(p−ci )2 , i = L, H , the derivatives of the vector-function represent-
ing the RHS of the system of five differential equations for z′L, z′H , 	′L, 	′H , g′ with respect to 
g, zi, 	i is summarized in the matrix
∇ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
bL
g2
0 0 0 0
bH
g2
0 0 0 0
− 2g(p)−zL2g2 − 12g 0 0 0
− 2g(p)−zH2g2 0 − 12g 0 0
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
where
D1 = 2((1 − α)bL(	L − s)+ αbH (	H − s))((1 − α)(	L − s)+ α(	H − s))[
(1 − α)zL(	L − s)+ αzH (	H − s)− 2g((1 − α)(	L − s)+ α(	H − s))
]2
D2 = − (1 − α)(	L − s) [(1 − α)bL(	L − s)+ αbH (	H − s)][
(1 − α)zL(	L − s)+ αzH (	H − s)− 2g((1 − α)(	L − s)+ α(	H − s))
]2
D3 = − α(	H − s) [(1 − α)bL(	L − s)+ αbH (	H − s)][
(1 − α)zL(	L − s)+ αzH (	H − s)− 2g((1 − α)(	L − s)+ α(	H − s))
]2
D4 = (2bLg − 2bHg + bHzL − bLzH )α(1 − α)(	L − s)[
(1 − α)zL(	L − s)+ αzH (	H − s)− 2g((1 − α)(	L − s)+ α(	H − s))
]2
D5 = − (2bLg − 2bHg + bHzL − bLzH )α(1 − α)(	H − s)[
(1 − α)zL(	L − s)+ αzH (	H − s)− 2g((1 − α)(	L − s)+ α(	H − s))
]2 .
Due to the condition (1 − α)FL(p1)(	L(p1) − s) + αFH (p1)(	H (p1) − s) > 0 all Di ’s are 
bounded and our vector-function is continuously differentiable. It is known that if a function is 
continuously differentiable on [p
H
, p], then it is Lipschitz-continuous on this interval.25 The 
statement of the Lemma then is an application of the Pickard–Lindelof theorem. 
25 Proof of this statement can be found on this web-page: http :/ /unapologetic .wordpress .com /2011 /05 /04 /
continuously-differentiable-functions-are-locally-lipschitz/.
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Note that as the five equations in the proof of Lemma A.8 are just a different representation 
of the system of differential equations (7) and (10), this system with boundary conditions Fi(p1)
and β(p1) also has a unique solution as long as the condition of the Lemma is satisfied. Later 
in the proof we show that Lemmas A.5–A.7 guarantee that the conditions of Lemma A.8 are 
satisfied in the relevant domains.
Theorem 1. For any values of s, λ, cL, cH and α a NRPE as defined in Definition 2 exists. 
The equilibrium price distributions are characterized by (7), while non-shopper’s behavior is 
determined by (10) whenever 0 < β(p) < 1.
Proof. Fix some p > max(ρNUL , cH + s), where ρNUL is the standard Stahl reservation price 
where there is no ex ante cost uncertainty and cost is known to be low. We first show that for any 
p, all equilibrium conditions except 
∫ p
p
H
FH (p)dp = s can be satisfied. The second part of the 
proof shows that this last condition can always be satisfied by an appropriate choice of p. Then, 
by applying Lemmas A.1 and A.2 we guarantee that the distribution functions are well-defined.
We write the solution of the system of differential equations with boundary conditions β , 
FL(p) = FH (p) = 1 as βˆ(p, β) and use β(p) whenever we refer to the equilibrium stopping 
probability. The solution βˆ(p, β) does not necessarily belong to [0, 1], while β(p) does. Note 
that according to Lemmas A.6 and A.7 for any price in the support of the high-cost distribution 
the condition of Lemma A.8 is satisfied. Then, from Lemma A.8 the solution is unique for any 
β . As solution paths cannot intersect, βˆ(p, β) is monotone in the second argument.
Next, we argue that there exists a unique β0 such that maxp∈[p
H
,p] βˆ(p, β0) = 1. First, 
Lemma A.5 together with βˆ ′(p, β) < 0 guarantee that the function βˆ(p, β) has a unique max-
imum on [p
H
, p]. Therefore, for any β the solution βˆ(p, β) either attains its maximum in 
the interior of [p
H
, p] or at p
H
.
26 In the latter case βˆ(p, β) is monotonically decreasing on 
[p
H
, p]. Second, independent of whether the maximum is attained in the interior or at the 
lower bound, for any b > 0 there is a value of β such that maxp∈[p
H
,p] βˆ(p, β) < b. To see 
this, note that if b0 is the largest value of β on this interval, then, as pH > cH , we have 
πL(p) >
1−λ
2 b0(p − cL) > 1−λ2 b0(cH − cL). At the same time πL = 1−λ2 β(p − cL). Thus,
b0 <
p − cL
cH − cL β ≡ b
and b can be chosen arbitrary small by an appropriate choice of β. Finally, there exists a value 
β such that maxp∈[p
H
,p] βˆ(p, β) ≥ 1. This follows immediately from the continuous differentia-
bility of βˆ and the fact that βˆ ′(p, β) < 0. Thus, as βˆ(p, β) is monotone in the second argument 
there is a unique β0 such that maxp∈[p
H
,p] βˆ(p, β0) = 1.
Now, we show that it is always possible to choose β such that a least one of the four types of 
NRPE exist. We start with considering the case when the maximum of βˆ(p, β0) is attained in the 
interior of [p
H
, p].
No-gap equilibrium. Consider a solution to the system of differential equations for the β0
defined above. Recall, from Lemma 2 that p∗(β0) is the largest price such that β(p) = 1. We con-
sider a candidate NRPE, such that for all prices p > p∗(β0) the consumer indifference condition 
26 With slight abuse of notation we write p
H
instead of p
H
(β).
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is satisfied and β(p) = βˆ(p, β0), and for all p ≤ p∗(β0) we set β(p) = 1. If ρL(β0) ≥ pH , then 
it is clear from Lemmas A.1–A.3 that all conditions for a NRPE to exist (apart from 	H = s) are 
satisfied.
Monopolistic gap equilibrium. Suppose then that ρL(β0) < pH . Take some price pˆ ∈
[p
H
, p∗(β0)], and construct a solution from that price pˆ for all p ∈ [pH , pˆ), using Fi(pˆ), 	i(pˆ)
and βˆ(pˆ) = 1 as boundary conditions. We denote this solution path as βˆpˆ(p, 1) to make clear 
that this is the mathematical solution to (10) starting from pˆ with βˆ(pˆ) = 1. Recall, that p0 is 
the highest price smaller than p
H
(such that β(p0) = 1) which makes the low-cost firm indif-
ferent between charging this price and charging p
H
. To construct an NRPE, it is necessary that 
p0 = ρL. From Lemmas A.5 and A.6, it follows that for any p ∈ [pH , pˆ)
∂βˆpˆ(p,1)
∂p
> 0. Together 
with Lemma A.8 this implies that βˆpˆ(pH , 1) is decreasing in pˆ and that p0 is continuous in 
pˆ. Note that limpˆ↓p
H
p0 = pH , which implies that limpˆ↓pH
∫ p0
p
L
FL(p)dp > s (as otherwise a 
no-gap equilibrium would exist).
We derive the following two conditions from the equal profits condition (taking into account 
that F(p
H
) = FL(p0))
p
L
= cL +
1−λ
2 β(p − cL)
1+λ
2 + 1−λ2
∫ p
p
H
(1 − β(p))fL(p)dp
(25)
and
p
H
− p0 =
(1 − βˆpˆ(pH ,1))FL(pH ) 1−λ2 (pH − cL)
λ(1 − FL(pH ))+ 1−λ2 (1 +
∫ p
p
H
(1 − β(p))fL(p)dp)
(26)
It is clear that p
H
−p0 > 0 for any βˆpˆ(pH , 1) < 1. As FL(pH ), 
∫ p
p
H
(1 − β(p))fL(p)dp and ∫ p0
p
L
FL(p)dp are all continuous in pˆ it must be the case that either
• there either exists a pˆ ∈ [p
H
(β0), p
∗(β0)] such that p0 = ρL (or 
∫ p0
p
L
FL(p)dp = s) and 
βˆpˆ(p, 1) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ [pH , p∗(β0)], meaning that there exists an NRPE;
• there exists pˆ0 ∈ [pH (β0), p∗(β0)] such that βˆpˆ0(pH , 1) = 0 while 
∫ p0
p
L
FL(p)dp > s, and 
we deal with this case under the competitive gap equilibrium;
• or ∫ p0
p
L
FL(p)dp > s for any pˆ ∈ [pH , p∗] and βˆpˆ(p, 1) > 0 for all p ∈ [pH , pˆ] and pˆ ∈
[p
H
, p∗(β0)], and we deal with this case in the regular gap equilibrium.
Regular gap equilibrium. Suppose then that for any pˆ ∈ [p
H
, p∗], ∫ p0
p
L
FL(p)dp > s, or 
equivalently, p0 > ρL. Note that if pˆ = p∗(β0) there exists a solution path βˆ(p, β0) with 
βˆ(p, β0) ≤ 1 and we can set β(p) = βˆ(p, β0). Moreover, βˆ(p, β) < 1 for any β < β0. Now, 
note that limβ→0 πL = 0 and therefore limβ→0 p0 = cL. As βˆ(p, β) is continuous in both argu-
ments, p0(β0) > ρL and ρL ≥ cL + s, there either exists β1 such that p0 = ρL with βˆ(p, β1) > 0
for all p ∈ [p
H
, p(β1)], meaning that the equilibrium exists, or there is a β2 < β0 such that 
βˆ(p
H
, β2) = 0 and p0(β2) > ρL, and we deal with this case in the competitive gap equilibrium.
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Competitive gap equilibrium. Suppose, that either pˆ0 in the monopolistic gap equilibrium 
or β2 in the competitive gap equilibrium exist, meaning that βˆ(pH ) = 0 and 
∫ p0
p
L
FL(p)dp > s. 
In both cases we take the solution on [p
H
, p] from the corresponding case and construct a NRPE 
such that β(p) = 0 for all p ∈ (ρL, pH ] and p0 = ρL and where low cost firms still choose prices 
in a left region of pH , denoted by [p′, pH ]. Note that as by definition β(p′) = 0 and β(p0) = 1 it 
follows from the equal profit condition for the low cost firms that p0 <p′. However, by choosing 
p′ sufficiently low, FL(p′) can be chosen arbitrarily close to zero, which as 
∫ ρL
p
L
FL(p)dp = s
implies that ρL > p′ > p0. Therefore, there must exist a p′ that p0 = ρL. This completes the 
proof for a given p for the case when β(p, β0) reaches its maximum in the interior of [pH , p].
Consider then the case where the maximum of βˆ(p, β0) is not attained in this interior, from
Lemma A.5, it follows then that the maximum must be reached at p
H
and βˆ(p
H
, β0) = 1. If in 
this case ρL ≥ pH , then, as previously, a no-gap equilibrium exists as we can simply set β(p) = 1
for all p < p
H
. Suppose then that ρL < pH . If for all β < β0 the maximum of βˆ(p, β) is attained 
at p
H
, then a regular gap equilibrium exists with β1 < β0 as βˆ(p, β1) > 0 for all p due to the 
monotonicity of βˆ(p, β1) in price. If for some β < β0 the maximum of βˆ(p, β) is attained in the 
interior of the support of the high cost distribution, then, using our analysis in the previous case 
we conclude that either a regular gap or a competitive gap equilibrium exists.
We have now proved that for any fixed p > max(cH + s, ρNUL ) we can satisfy all equilibrium 
conditions apart from the fact that in an NRPE we should have 
∫ p
p
H
FH (p) = s. We now prove 
that we can always choose p such that this indifference condition is also satisfied. To do so, we 
first realize that as cH > cL we have
lim
p↓ρNUL
p∫
p
H
FH (p)dp < s.
We next show that for sufficiently large p, the other equilibrium conditions imply that
p∫
p
H
FH (p)dp > s.
As 
∫ p
p
H
FH (p)dp is continuous in p, it follows then that there must be a p such that ∫ p
p
H
FH (p)dp = s. Thus, the only thing to be proved is that for p sufficiently large,∫ p
p
H
FH (p)dp > s. To this end, it follows from
π(p|cH ) = 1 − λ2 (1 − β(p))(p − cH ) <
1 − λ
2
(p − cH )
and
π(p
H
|cH ) > 1 + λ2 (pH − cH )
and the fact that a firm has to be indifferent between charging the upper and lower bound of the 
price distribution that
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p − p
H
>
2λ
1 + λ(p − cH ). (27)
Thus, the support of the mixed strategy distribution grows without bound when p becomes larger. 
Suppose then that 
∫ p
p
H
FH (p)dp < s even for large p. This would imply that for all 
 > 0 there 
exist a large p such that FH(
p+p
H
2 ) < 
. Let us then consider the profit a firm makes when 
setting prices p
H
and [p + p
H
]/2:
π(p
H
|cH ) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣1 + λ2 + 1 − λ2
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
p+p
H
2∫
p
H
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜ +
p∫
p+p
H
2
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
× (p
H
− cH ),
and
π
(
p + p
H
2
|cH
)
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣1 + λ2 −
[
λ+ 1 − λ
2
(1 − β(p + pH
2
))
]
FH
(
p + p
H
2
)
+
1 − λ
2
p∫
p+p
H
2
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
(
p + p
H
2
− cH
)
.
As by choosing p we can make FH
(
p+p
H
2
)
arbitrarily small and as 1 − β(p˜) < 1, it is clear 
that
π(p
H
|cH ) <
⎡
⎢⎢⎣1 + λ2 + 1 − λ2 FH
(
p + p
H
2
)
+ 1 − λ
2
p∫
p+p
H
2
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
× (p
H
− cH ),
so that
π
(
p + p
H
2
|cH
)
− π(p
H
|cH ) >⎡
⎢⎣1 + λ2 + 1 − λ2
p∫
p/2
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜ − 1 − λ2 FH
(
p + p
H
2
)⎤⎥⎦ p − pH2 −
λFH
(
p + p
H
2
)(
p + p
H
2
− cH
)
,
using (27) it follows that
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π
(
p + p
H
2
|cH
)
− π(p
H
|cH ) >⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
⎡
⎢⎣1 + λ2 + 1 − λ2
p∫
p/2
(1 − β(p˜))fi(p˜)dp˜ − 1 − λ2 FH (
p + p
H
2
)
⎤
⎥⎦ λ1 + λ
− λFH (
p + p
H
2
)
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ (p − cH ),
which is clearly positive for large p. This implies that for large p a high cost firm cannot be 
indifferent over the whole support of the price distribution if 
∫ p
p
H
FH (p)dp < s. 
Appendix C. Idiosyncratic cost
Consider the case where firms are known to have a high common cost. The low cost case is 
identical. The first, preliminary, but important, result is that the price distributions of the firm 
with low and high idiosyncratic cost cannot overlap, and that the upper bound of the low cost 
distribution should be no larger than the lower bound of the high cost distribution, denoted 
by p
iH
. To see this, suppose that both the high and low cost firm have a range of prices p
in the interior of their support and that they sell with probability q(p). As the high cost firm 
has to be indifferent between charging these different prices, it follows that q(p)(p − ciH )
equals a constant K that is independent of p. But then the profit of the low cost firm equals 
q(p)(p − ciL) = K(p − ciL)/(p − ciH ), i = L, H , which is decreasing in p. As, because of the 
shoppers, there cannot be mass points, it follows that the distributions do not overlap.
We then derive the equilibrium price distribution functions for both types of players. The 
distribution function FiH (p) of the firm with high idiosyncratic cost has to satisfy the following
πiH (p) =
[
λγ (1 − FiH (p))+ 1 − λ2
]
(p − ciH ) =
(
λγ + 1 − λ
2
)
(ρi − ciH ),
so that
FiH (p)) = 1 − 1 − λ2λγ
ρi − p
p − ciH .
These are the standard formulae, except for the factor γ and the fact that the determination of the 
reservation price ρH is different (see below). Note that as the low cost distribution is below the 
high cost price distribution, the high cost firm only attracts the shoppers if the other firm also has 
a high idiosyncratic cost component.
The distribution function FiL(p) of the firm with low idiosyncratic cost has to satisfy the 
following
πiH (p) =
[
λ {γ + (1 − γ )(1 − FiL(p))} + 1 − λ2
]
(p − ciL) = 1 − λ2 (piH − ciL),
so that
FiL(p) = 1 − 1 − λ+ 2γ λ2λ(1 − γ )
(
p
iH
− p
p − ciL
)
. (28)
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Note here that the low cost firm always attracts the shoppers if the other firm has a high id-
iosyncratic cost component. Note also that if the idiosyncratic cost shock is the only uncertainty, 
it has to be the case that the upper bound of the low cost price distribution equals the lower bound 
of the high cost price distribution.
It remains to determine the reservation price ρi . As under idiosyncratic cost uncertainty there 
is no learning, consumers have to be indifferent between buying and continuing to search at the 
reservation price, i.e.,
ρi = γEiH (p)+ (1 − γ )EiL(p)+ s,
where EiH (p) is the expected price of a firm with idiosyncratic cost j = L, H . It may happen that 
ρi ≤ ciH , in which case the high cost firm’s price distribution is degenerate and EiH(p) = ciH . 
Using the proof of Lemma 1 in Janssen et al. (2011), these expected prices can be written as
EiH (p) = (1 − αiH )ciH + αiHρi, and EiL(p) = (1 − αiL)ciL + αiLpiH ,
respectively, where αiH =
∫ 1
0
1
1+ 2λγ1−λ z
dz, αiL =
∫ 1
0
1
1+ 2λ(1−γ )1−λ+2λγ z
dz, and p
iH
= ciH+
1−λ
2λγ ρi
1+ 1−λ2λγ
. Thus, 
the reservation price is defined by
ρi =
[
γ (1 − αiH )+ (1 − γ ) 2λγ2λγ+1−λαiL
]
ciH + (1 − γ )(1 − αiL)ciL + s
1 − γ αiH − (1 − γ ) 1−λ2λγ+1−λαiL
.
This fully characterizes the equilibrium under idiosyncratic cost uncertainty only.
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